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PREFACE 
In the fall of 1967, I attended Schiller College in Kleininger-
sheim, Germany. The school was located in a castle high above the 
Neckar which was once owned by the Radowitz family. Several years 
later, while studying the early life of Otto von Bismarck, I once 
again encountered the name Radowitz in the person of his contemporary, 
Joseph Maria von Radowitz. I became interested in his identity and 
role in German history and soon discovered that very little work had 
been done on him by American scholars •. This. led to further research 
and eventually to this thesis. 
In spite of his relative obscurity, the importance of Radowitz to 
German history is great. His career stretched from the Napoleonic era 
to the Revolution of 1848. Through a study of his work for German 
unification one covers such significant events as the Frankfurt National 
Assembly and, most important, the Prussian Plan of Union and the con-
ference at 01mrrtz. 
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the help and 
patience of Dr. Douglas D. Hale, who was always willing to give of his 
time in order to help me complete this thesis. I also would like to 
thank Dr. George Fe Jewsbury for his encouragement and understanding. 
Further credit is due to Dr. w. A. Owings, Dr. James G. Caster, Dr. 
Lloyd K. Musselman, Professor Virgil D. Medlin, and Professor Willis 
O. Sadler for urging me to enter graduate studies. I would also like 
to thank Dr. Homer L. Knight, Dr. James Henderson, and Dr. Norbert R. 
Mahnken for their advice during my period of study at Oklahoma State 
University. 
I also wish to express my gratitude to my father and stepmother, 
Mr, and Mrs. Warren B. Morris, Sr., for the sacrifices they have made 
in order to make my education possible, and to my mother, Mrs. Phyllis 
Jean Newman, for her help and support. Finally, I would like to thank 
the Baroness Freia von Radowitz for her interest in my study. 
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CHAPTER I. 
RAOOWITZ'S ORIGINS 
Before 1871, Germany did not exist as a political entity. 
Instead, some thirty-nine separate German states were organized in a 
loose Confederation. In 1$48, the winds of revolution swept across 
the states and resulted in the demand by many Germans for the erection 
of a united nation state to replace this Confederation. During this 
revolution and for several years afterwards, one of the leaders in the 
movement for German unification was Joseph Maria von Radowitz. As the 
Prussian delegate to the Military Committee of the German Confedera-
tion, he observed firsthand the ineffectiveness, impotence, and dis-
unity of the organization. Even before 1848, he made a strong effort 
to persuade Frederick William IV of Prussia and Prince Metternich to 
agree to take measures to reform the structure of the Confederation. · 
When this first endeavor toward German unification met with failure 
owing to the outbreak of the revolution, he continued his work through 
the Frankfurt National Assembly. After this too ended in vain, Rado-
witz refused to give up his fight and sought to unify Genna.ny on the 
basis of a union headed by Prussia. The purpose of this study is to 
analyze these efforts and draw conclusions from them concerning the 
role of Radowitz in German history. 
Since the Middle Ages, at a time when other areas were developing 
into modem nation states, the old Holy Roman Empire was in the process 
of disintegration. After the conclusion of the wars of religion, 
what had been the Empire was divided into over 300 semi-independent 
states. This process of disunion was accompanied by the rise of a new 
power, Prussia, to challenge the traditional hegemony held by the 
Habsburg dynasty. Under the leadership of such men as Frederick 
William, the Great Elector, Frederick William I, the Soldier King, and 
Frederick the Great, Prussia rose from an insignificant electorate to 
become one of the most important kingdoms in Europe and a major rival 
to the Habsburg rulers in Vienna. 
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The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 proved a major 
turning point in German history. In 1792 war broke out between the 
revolutionary government in Paris and the German states led by Austria. 
In 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte rose to power as the leader of the French 
cause. Through his military brilliance, he was able to inflict a 
series of major defeats on his German enemies. After he had conquered 
the Habsburg lands, he reorganized the subject German states into the 
Confederation of the Rhine and thus dealt the death blow to the Holy 
Roman Empire. In the French-dominated confederation, many of the 
smaller German states and ecclesiastical states were eliminated, thus 
reducing substantially the number of independent states. Simul-
taneously, Bavaria and wUrttemberg were elevated to the level of king-
doms. In 1806, Napoleon completed his subjection of Germany through 
his defeat of Prussia at the battle of Jena. 
The defeat of Germany by the French contributed to the awakening 
of German nationalismo Such men as the author Heinrich van Kleist in 
his "Catechism of the Germans," and the philosopher Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte in his Fourteen Addresses ~ the German Nation helped spread 
3 
the new gospel of German nationalism to all elements of the society. 
This movement was furthered by the reforms in Prussia undertaken by 
Karl Heinrich Reichsfreiherr von und zum Stein. Finally the process 
of driving the French out of Germany and Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig 
in 1813 added to the development of a national sentiment among the 
Gennan people. 
At the end of the War of Liberation, the advocates of German uni-
fication were dealt a major disappointment when they received from 
the powers of Europe assembled at Vienna not the Gennan nation state 
for which they had fought, but a loose Confederation of thirty-nine 
sovereign German states. The Gennan Confederation was fonnalized in 
the Treaty of Vienna signed on June 9, 1815. The major policymaking 
body of the Gennan Confederation was the Federal Diet, which met at 
Frankfurt am Main. The membership of this body consisted of delegates 
of the member states. Though the Diet possessed the authority to 
approve laws for the Confederation, each act of legislation required 
the approval of two-thirds of the membership, while any change in the 
constitution could not go into effect without the unanimous consent 
of the member states •1 
Moreover, the Federal Diet failed to meet on a regular basis. 
Instead, the Select Council, under the presidency of the Emperor of 
Austria, carried on the day-to-day business of the Confederation. All 
actions required the consent of a simple majority of the membership. 
Each of the larger states had one vote, while the smaller German states 
were combined in seven ''curias" for representation. In 1821, the 
1Hajo Holborn, ! History 2f Modern Gennany (3 vols., New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), II, 445. 
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powers of the Council were complemented by the formation of a Federal 
Military Committee. 2 This Confederation was a far cry from the united 
German nation state hoped for by so many during the War of Liberation. 
Actually, it was a "united nations" formed by the German states. Al-
though the number of German states had been decreased from over 300 
to but thirty-nine, real German unification had not been achieved. 
This was the Germany in which Joseph Maria von Radowitz began his first 
efforts toward real and lasting German unification. 
The early life of Joseph Maria von Radowitz was known to very few 
during his lifetime. Veit Valentin, the Weimar historian, wrote that 
no one knew for sure who he really was or from where he had come. 3 
Yet his origins are quite clear, and a knowledge of his background is 
essential to an understanding of his role in German history. His 
immediate ancestry can be traced to Hungary, where in 1460 there is a 
record of the participation of Libaf de Radovvicz in the Congress of 
Brllim. His grandfather, Demetrius von Radowitz, fought as a soldier 
on the Austrian side during the Seven Years' war. After his capture 
at the Battle of Lowosits in 1757, the elder Radowitz decided to re-
main in the German state of Saxony. Joseph Maria von Radowitz, the 
father of the subject of this study, was born in Hungary, studied law 
at the University of GHttingen, and moved to Blankenburg, where the 
Duke of Brunswick granted him the right to practice his profession. 
Here, Joseph Maria Ernst Christian Wilhelm von Radowitz was born on 
2Ibid.' 446. 
3Veit Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution (2 vols., 
Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1968), r,-320. 
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February 6, 1797.4 
At the behest of his father, young Radowitz was trained for a 
military career, a vocation appropriate enough for the Napoleonic era 
in which he came of age. As a young boy, he attended elementary and 
secondary schools at Albenburg, and in 1B08 his father sent him to 
enter the military school at Mainz. He continued his education 
through the study of military science and artillery at the Polytechnic 
School at Paris. On January 1, 1812, Radowitz entered the Artillery 
and Engineering school at Kassel. On December 23, 1812, he was com-
missioned lieutenant in the Second Infantry of Hesse-Kassel, at that 
time a component of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Westphalia, and was 
assigned to the Headquarters of the Second Army Corps under Marshal 
MacDonald. At the Battle of Leipzig, Radowitz led the Thirty-First 
Division of Westphalian Infantry and received a minor wound in the 
chest. After Leipzig, like so many of his contemporaries, he turned 
against Napoleon, joined the newly organized Hessian Army, and fought 
the forces of the French Emperor in Franceo After Napoleon's defeat, 
Radowitz was appointed instructor of mathematics and military science 
at the Military Academy in Kassele 5 
The accession of Elector William II to the throne of Hesse-Kassel 
proved to be a turning point in Radowitz's careero His old commander 
was made head of the War Department of the small Electorate and pro-
mated him to a position on the General Staff o In his new position, he 
~chus von Liliencron, ~ ~o, eds., Allgemeine deutsche 
Biographie (56 vols., Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1875-1912), XXVII, 
141. 
5Joseph Maria von Radowitz, Zur Geschichte meines Lebens, in Paul 
Hassel, Joseph Maria von Radowitz-rr97-1848 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried 
Mittler und Sohn, 1905'}"";" 4=6; Hasse , Radowitz, 144. 
was sent to Prussia, where on October 14, 1821, Radowitz first met 
the man who would play such an important role in his work for German 
unification, the Prussian Crown Prince and future Frederick William 
IV. 6 He was highly impressed with what he saw and developed a great 
respect for Prussia and the Crown Prince. 
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Radowitz would have continued to serve the small German Electorate 
of Hesse-Kassel and might have died in relative obscurity had not fate 
intervened to force him to leave his comfortable position and seek a 
new homeland. In 1823, a major crisis shook the calm of the small 
German state. The new Elector insisted in bringing his mistress, 
Emilie Ortl8pp, from Berlin to his capital. Naturally, the Electoress 
Augusta, the sister of King Frederick William III of Prussia, had strong 
objections to her presence at Court. To add insult to injury, he 
invited her and her children to move into the palace and gave her the 
title of Countess Reichenbach. The Electoress refused to accept this 
and made several appeals to her brother in Berlin .. 7 
Through his open support of the Electoress and his criticism of 
William II, Radowitz became involved in the dispute. This earned him 
the displeasure of the Elector. On June 13, 1823, he ordered the 
garrison to assemble at the Friedrichplatz and announced the demotion 
of several important officers, including Radowitz, who had supported 
the Electoress. The young officer was informed that he had been 
reassigned to Marburg and that he was not to leave his new post. 
6Radowitz, Meines Lebens, 13-20. 
?Heinrich von Treitschke, History: 2f. Germany in ~Nineteenth 
Century (6 vols., trans. by Eden & Cedar Paul, London: Jarrold & 
Sons, 1918), IV, 352-354. 
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Realizing the gravity of the situation, he began immediate corres-
pondence with Prussian officials in an effort to obtain a new position, 
Exiled on June 25, he used his contacts in Berlin to obtain a posi-
tion at the rank of captain on the Prussian General Staff. After 
making arrangenents for the care of his mother, he arrived in the 
Prussian capital to assume his new post on December B, 1B23.B 
In Berlin, Radowitz renewed his acquaintance with the Crown Prince 
and strengthened his ties with the court through his position as tutor 
to Prince Albrecht, the youngest son of King Frederick William III. 
Owing to his friendship with the Crown Prince and through their mutual 
interest in mystical religion, Radowitz was promoted to the position 
of Chief of the General Staff of the Artillery on February 14, 1B30. 
He was then introduced into high court cirlces through his friend. 
In the summer of 1830, Radowitz was to accompany the Crown Prince on a 
proposed journey to Paris, but because of the outbreak of the Revolu-
tion of 1B30, plans were changed and they traveled to England instead. 
The revolution deeply impressed the Prussian officer and had a pro-
found impact on the development of his political philosophy. He also 
developed respect for Great Britain and the institutions he observed 
during his sojourn in that country. Again in 1B32 he traveled with 
the Crown Prince, this time to Italy. On the way, Radowitz was intro-
duced into the courts of several German states, thus making contacts 
which would be useful when he began his work for German unification. 9 
Radowitz strengthened his contacts with high society in his 
BRadowitz, Meines Lebens, 13-20. 
9Tuid. 
adopted land through his marriage into an old Prussian aristocratic 
family. In 1826, he met the Countess Marie von Voss during a visit 
8 
to the home of Gustaf von Rochow. He fell deeply in love with her and 
proposed on February 13, 1828, during a ball at the palace of Duke 
Carl von Mecklenburg-Strelitz. After gaining the approval of her 
parents, they were married later that year .. 10 Thus, through his 
marriage to a member of an old respected Prussian family, Radowitz 
strengthened his ties with the ruling classes. 
The growing influence of Radowitz on the Crown Prince caused 
serious concern among some members of the established aristocracy, who 
mistrusted him because of his non-Prussian origin and membership in the 
Roman Catholic Church. The Minister of War even suggested the expedi-
ency of his removal from Berlin. Frederick William III agreed to this 
suggestion, but rather than e.xile Radowit.z he appointed him Prussian 
representative to the Military Committee of the German Confederation 
in Frankfurt, thus separating him from the Crown Prince. Radowitz•s 
experiences in Frankfurt were the major reason for his desire to 
refonn the German Confederation •. Here he saw firsth~d the complete 
ineffectiveness of the organization and realized that as long as the 
various German states worked against each other out of jealousy, 
nothing of merit could be accomplished. This became most apparent in 
1841, when he tried in vain to develop a strong military organization 
to meet the threat of a possible French invasion.11 
The obscurity of Radowitz' s origins was enhanced by the air of 
lOibid., 33-35· 
11rbid.' 49-90. 
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mystery conveyed by his personal appearance and actions in public. 
He was tall and well built with fiery deep set eyes, a high brow and 
a mustache that gave him a decidedly non-Prussian look. He was also 
something of an introvert. At social functions, he had the habit of 
sitting alone reading a book, occasionally glancing up and interjecting 
an opinion into the discussion carried on about him. He was very 
abstemious in his eating habits, consumed no alcoholic beverages, and 
12 drank only water. 
One of the most important factors in Radowitz's life was his re-
ligion. During the years in service to Hesse-Kassel, he found time 
to pause from the storm and stress of the Napoleonic era and to con-
sider matters of the mind and spirit. During these "quiet years" he 
developed an interest in art, literature, music, and most important, 
religion. As a young boy he had been educated in the Protestantism of 
his mother, but found little inspiration in this religion. In a search 
for something deeper, he turned to science and philosophy. However, 
he found little comfort in natural religion. He next began a serious 
study of history in a search for the true religion. This led him to 
adopt Roman Catholicism, the faith of his father, in 1816.13 
His new found religious belief soon became the most important 
thing in his life. He developed an interest in religious mysticism. 
Radowitz believed that the only valid source of truth was through 
reaching an understanding of the divinity. He also wrote a series of 
articles to explain his adopted faith. Significantly enough, most of 
12.rreitschke, History of Germany, VI, 314. 
l3Radowitz, Meines Lebens, 9-10. 
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these are presented in the romantic fonn of "fragments". His most 
important work on religion was his ~Iconography 2!, ~Saints. 
Here he applied the results of his historical research to describe the 
various symbols of the saints from the beginning of Christianity. The 
contents of this book reveal Rad.owitz as a dedicated researcher and 
well developed scholar.14 
The importance of Rad.owitz' s religion transcended purely spiritual 
matters and became a part of his political career. It has already been 
mentioned that his mystical Catholicism strengthened his ties with 
Frederick William IV, who although a Protestant, was also something of 
a religious mystic. In his writings, Radowitz consistently argued 
that the Church should concern itself solely with religious matters 
and leave political affairs·to the jurisdiction of the state. In "The 
Church and Political Freedom," he stated that the Roman Catholic Church 
in Germany had made a major mistake by linking Catholic interests with 
the destinies of Bavaria and Austria. The Prussian officer declared 
it a cardinal error to tie the welfare of the Church to a particular 
political system.15 This position was important, since one of the 
things that had helped divide Germany into factions was the matter of 
religion. 
In addition to his religious development, Radowitz also became 
concerned with political matters. During his first excursion with the 
14Rsdowitz, "Wahrheit," Gesarmnelte Schriften (5 vols., Berlin: 
Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1853), V, 69; Iconographie der Heiligen, 
ibid. , I, 1-283. 
l5Raciowitz, "Die Provisoren und die Allianzen," "Kirchliche und 
politischen Freiheit," "Die europH.ische Politik und die Juli-Revolu,;,. 
tion," "Idealismus41aterialismus in der Politik," and "Die Provisoren," 
in Gesarmnelte Schtiften, IV, 43, 81-84, 168, 192. 
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Crown Prince, Radowitz had been afforded an opportunity to view 
closely the outbreak of the R.evolution of 1830. This proved to be a 
turning point in his political development. In his "European Politics 
and the July Revolution," a discussion of the R.evolution and its im-
portance to European history, he advanced the theory that once a revo-
lution had begun it could not be stopped in mid-development, but would 
continue until it had run its course. In his assessment of the mon-
archy of Louis Philippe, Radowitz saw a dangerous emphasis on material-
istic concerns, which he believed should be secondary to spiritual 
matters. However, Radowitz was not a supporter of absolutism: this 
he felt to be as reprehensible as the materialism of the French state. 
From impressions gained during his journey to England, he considered 
the settlement reached by the Glorious R.evolution of 1688 to be the 
best alternative to the extremes of absolutism and the excesses 
reached by the French after 1789.16 This position reveals Radowitz 
as a moderate who refused to support either extreme and also places 
him closer in the political spectrum to the German liberal reformers 
than to the Prussian Junker class. 
His most important political work during the pre-March period 
was his Collogµies upon State ~ Church, published anonymously in 
1$46. In this book, the form used is a discussion between a Prussian 
officer, a liberal, a bureaucrat, and a socialist. Each states his 
political position, and Waldheim, the central character and a personi-
fication of the author, intervenes to condemn political factionalism 
and the divisions it can cause in society. Waldheim's arguments are 
12 
couched in diplomatic te:rms and reveal the moderation of the author. 
Not only is democracy criticized as a source of partisan division, but 
absolute monarchy is also condemned as a relic of the past; it was no 
longer viable as a :fo:rm of government. The disdain :for political 
parties as divisive :forces in society is a very important part of Rado-
witz's political philosophy. In 1847, he elaborated on this argument 
through a series of "Speeches not Delivered in the United Diet. 1117 
In his political system, Radowitz placed great emphasis on Ge:rman 
nationalism. He wrote that the highest :fo:rm of statehood was national-
ism based on ":family, • • • origin, and :folk traditions." He saw the 
history of Europe since the Middle Ages as the process of the destruc-
tion or the multinational state and the creation or new nations based 
on common origins and culture.· He cited the examples of France and 
Spain as models ror Germans to emulate. In his writings, Radowitz 
traced the awakening or German nationalism back to such men as Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing, who in his Letters Concerning ~Newest Literature, 
called for an end to blind imitation or French literary trends and for 
th~ creation or a Ge:rman literature based on the English model or 
Shakespeare. According to Radowitz, the German poets and thinkers 
spread this nationalism· from the Eider to the Alps and from the Mosel 
18 to the Pregel. 
In the year before the R.evolution of 1848, Radowitz made his 
first efforts to secure a revision of the Confederation toward the 
l7Hassel, Radowitz, 418-419; Radowitz, "Red.en welche in den Stlln.de-
Salle zu Berlin nicht gehalten warden," Gesammelte Schri:ften, III, 
195-253· 
18Radowitz, "Frankfurt am Main, Erste Abschnit t vor 1848," ibid., 
II, 8-19. 
13 
unification of Germany. On October 12, 1847, he sent to King Frederick 
William IV, who had ascended the Prussian throne in 1840, a proposal 
for changes in the Confederation. In this document, he pointed out the 
faults of the old organization and argued that Prussia, by being tied 
to Austrian interests, was prevented from taking any actions to protect 
herself in the event of a serious crisis. He asked the King to use 
his influence to call a congress of the princes to discuss a set of 
proposed changes in the composition of the Confederation. Radowitz 
proposed that a majority of two-thirds of the Diet be granted the 
power to change the constitution of the Confederation instead of the 
absolute unanimity required by the Treaty of Vienna. In the place of 
the old Confederation, he recommended the formation of a new structure 
based on the Customs Union which had been created between 1818 and 
1846 under Prussian auspices. Austrian control over Prussian interests 
would thus be eliminated. To settle any dispute between member states, 
he suggested the establishment of a Supreme Court. Important aspects 
of his plan called for common criminal and commercial law codes, emi-
gration regulations, and a unified postal and military system.19 
Radowitz elaborated his proposals in "Thoughts on the Pressing 
Needs of the German Confederation," published on November 20, 1847. 
In this work, he pronounced the German Confederation a complete 
failure. To support this contention, he cited its inability to face 
the threat posed by the July Revolution of 1830, the lack of agreement 
l9"Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Frankfurt am Main, October 12, 
1847," Radowitz, Nachgelassene Briefe und Aufzeichnungen ~ Geschichte 
der Jahre 1848-1853 lHistorischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Deutsche Geschichtsguellen ~ ;b2_. ~­
hunderts] (OsnabrU.ck: Biblio Verlag, 1967), 1-4. 
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concerning military precautions in response to the possibility of 
French attack in 1841, and the rivalry among the small states and be-
tween Austria and Prussia. Radowitz maintained that it was very im-
portant that the old divisions cease and that Prussia remain a strong 
20 
state. 
The King reacted favorably to his advisor's proposals, and on 
the same day of the publication of his "Thoughts," Radowitz received 
approval to carry out his plans. After some delay, he undertook a 
trip to Vienna to discuss his ideas with Prince Klemens von Metternich, 
Austrian Foreign Minister, and arrived in the Austrian capital on 
March 4, 1848. Metternich received Radowitz and his proposals with 
unusual cordiality, since the Revolution of 1848 had just broken out, 
and the Prince was anxious to come to an accord with the Prussians. 
It was agreed that a congress consisting of either the German princes 
of their representatives would be surrnnoned to meet in Dresden. The 
ministers also reached agreement on a proposed military congress to 
21 
meet on March 30. 
But the outbreak of the revolution in Vienna, which Radowitz 
witnessed, and the flight of Metternich on March 14 rendered his first 
efforts at achieving the reform of the German Confederation and German 
unification futile. Although these efforts of 1847 and early 1848 
were unsuccessful, they are still very important in showing that 
certain German officials realized the faults of the Confederation 
20Radowitz, "Denkschrift tlber die vom deutsche Bunde zu ergreifen-
den Massregeln," Deutschland 1!lli!, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, in Gesarnmelte 
Schriften, III, 334-337• 
2111Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Vienna, March 4, 6, and 13, 
1848," Nachgelassene Briere, 11, 12, 24-25. 
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and the need for unification. Radowitz's proposals, however, contained 
one important flaw in that they envisioned reform from above and made 
no attempt to enlist the support of the German people. With the up-
rising of the people in March, 1848, Radowitz's proposals had been 
outpaced by events. 
The fall of King Louis Philippe of France on February 23, 1848, 
soon triggered the outbreak of revolution in Germany. From France 
the revolutionary fervor spread to the south German states. Public 
meetings in Mannheim and Heidelberg issued demands for freedom of 
the press, trial by jury, the iritroduction of constitutional govern-
ment in all German states, and the calling of a national parliament 
to discuss the revision of the German Confederation. In these states, 
well-known progressives, or "March Ministers," were appointed to high 
positions in the governments. In Baden, Karl Mathy beqame the Prime 
Minister, and Karl Theodor Welcker was appointed the new minister 
to the Federal Diet. In wrrrttemberg, Paul Pfizer was elevated to a 
cabinet position. In Hesse-Darmstadt, Heinrich von Gagern, who later 
became the President of the Frankfurt National Assembly, was appointed 
Prime Minister. In Munich, King Ludwig I was forced to abdicate as a 
result of his affair with Lola Montez. From the south the revolution 
spread to other German states. In Hanover, King Ernst August appointed 
liberal ministers, thus undoing the authoritarian coup of 1837. 22 
From southern Germany, the revolution then found its way to Austria. 
On March 13, after a series of disturbances centered around the City 
Hall, Metternich was forced to resign, thus causing the failure of 
22Holborn, ! History .£!:.Modern Germany, III, 48. 
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Radowitz's first attempts at German unification. 23 
Radowitz reacted to the revolution by first pressing for the 
calling of his proposed Congress at Dresden which he believed would 
revise the Confederation, unify Germany, and thus solve the problems 
posed by the revolution. On March 17, he realized that things had 
progressed to such a point as to make this idea impossible. In a 
letter to his wife, the Prussian statesman expressed the fear that the 
result of the revolution would be the end of the Prussian monarchy and 
also his service. On the same day, he informed the King of the refusal 
of the south German states to participate in the proposed meeting at 
Dresden. On March 16, Radowitz sent his friend a letter advising the 
appointment of several ministers dedicated to constitutionalism and 
open discussion in the cabinet. He further suggested the end of 
censorship and the calling of the Prussian United Diet to prepare a 
new constitutional system based on representative government. In the 
event of an uprising in Berlin, Radowitz advised Frederick William IV 
to call the troops back to their barracks at Spandau, since a pro-
longed battle in the city would only serve to demoralize the troops 
and their leadership.24 
Radowitz's ideas represented the thoughts of a progressive 
realist. He knew that once the forces of revolution had been un~ 
leashed, a return to the old order would be impossible. He had wit-
nessed the fall of Charles X in 1830, and more recently that of 
23Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, I, 402-405e 
24"Radowitz to Canitz, Vienna7 March 16, 1848," and "Radowitz 
to Frederick William IV, Vienna, March l 7, 1848," Nachgelassene Briefe, 
31, 36; "Radowi tz to Frederick William IV, Vienna, March 16, 1848;" 
Hassel, Radowitz, 572-574• 
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Metternich, and did not want to see the same thing happen to his King. 
He was also progressive in the sense that he supported changes that 
would remove some of the causes of discontent. Even before the 
revolution, he had realized that the existing Confederation had to be 
revised in order to enable it to meet the demands of the modern world. 
As Radowitz feared, the revolution which had swept the rest of 
Germany soon reached Berlin. The center of revolutionary activity 
in the Prussian Capital was a park along the Spree, called the Zelte 
after the tents which had, once stood on the location. On March 7, the 
King issued a decree announcing the regular meeting of the full United 
Diet and called upon his people to stand behind him rather than revolt 
as the people of other German states had done. The crowd at the Zelte 
replied by drafting a petition demanding the immediate calling of the 
United Diet and the freedom of the press. It is significant that the 
leadership in the crowd decided to mail this document to their 
sovereign rather than march on the Palace. 
This initial protest was followed by a series of clashes between 
the troops guarding the city and the people. These reached a climax 
on March 16, when a company of soldiers attempting to clear a square 
killed two persons. On the evening of March 17, Frederick William IV 
signed a patent announcing the opening of the Diet on April 2, con-
ceding to it the authority to control finances and granting it the 
right to meet regularly, as the first United Diet had demanded in 1847. 
The King also ordered soldiers from as far away as Magdeburg into the 
city to quell any possible trouble. At 10:00 on the morning of March 
18, a crowd assembled in front of the Palace, and the monarch presented 
himself to it. Because of an insult either to the King or his troops, 
18 
an officer commanding a cavalry regiment ordered his men to open fire. 
The soldiers fired two shots, causing the people to disperse and begin 
the erection of barricades throughout the city. The troops began the 
reduction of the barricades late in the afternoon, and during the 
night the fighting continued, but little was actually accomplished 
by either side. 25 
The sight of his subjects involved in fratricidal combat greatly 
distressed Frederick William IV. During that night, he drafted a 
proclamation, "To the Inhabitants of my Beloved Father City," which 
promised to withdraw all troops from Berlin if the people would in 
turn demolish all barricades and send him men of "the pure old spirit 
of Berlin." He also promised to devote himself to the creation of a 
new Prussia and through it, a new Germany. The people formed a pro-
cession bearing the bodies of those killed defending the barricades 
and marched to the Palace. The King was forced to receive this 
demonstration and remove his hat in its honor. 26 While it would be 
an oversimplification to suggest that the letter of Radowi tz on March 
16 was the sole reason for these actions of the King, it is indicative 
of the influence wielded by the King's friend that the course he 
suggested was that taken in the end. 
At first the news from Berlin greatly distressed ~dowitz, but 
25Priscilla Robertson, ~ Revolutions Q! 1848: ! Soci.al History 
(Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1967) , 116-117; Andrew 
Jackson Donelson, "The American Minister in Berlin on the Revolution 
of March, 1848," American Historical Review, XXIII, No. 2 (January 26, 
1918), 360. 
2611Berlin 16 Mirz," Deutsche Zeitung, March 23, 1848, 659; Hans 
Blum, Die deutsche Revolution, 1848-1849 (Leipzig: Eugen, Diederichs, 
1897), 190. 
19 
after the full details of what had taken place reached him, he began 
to approve of what the King had done. He believed that through his 
statements to the people, Frederick William had placed himself at the 
head of Germany and finally separated the destiny of Prussia from that 
of Austria. He felt that the King should now steer a middle course 
between the extremes of radicalism and reaction, depending upon his 
leadership of the army in time of war as a basis for his restoration 
to power. He believed that the monarch should remain above the petty 
fighting among parties, gain support from the monarchists in the 
liberal-constitutional party, and most important, show his concern for 
the plight of the working class. To Radowitz, the workers were not 
opposed to monarchy and would support their King if he advocated re-
form in their favor. From Vienna, the Prussian emissary advised the 
King to support the adoption.of a constitution similar to that of the 
English. He also suggested that he remain aloof from the arguments 
over the constitution; when the combatants of the various factions 
were numb from the struggle, he should intervene as a leader and thus 
restore his power. Radowitz's proposals caused no little discussion 
among the more intimate members of the court. Indeed, after a session 
in the Queen's tea room during which Radowitz's ideas formed a large 
part of the topic for conversation, General Leopold von Gerlach con-
cluded that the King's friend was crazy. 27 
While revolution and confusion reigned at Berlin, Radowitz joined 
27"Radowitz to his wife, Vienna, March 24, 1848, 11 Nachgelassene 
Briefe, 42; "Denkschrift, March 28, 1848, 11 and 11Radowitz to King 
Frederick William IV, April 2, 1848·," Hassel, Radowitz, 5777 580; 
Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwll.rdigkeiten (6 vols., Berlin: Verlag von 
Wilhelm Hertz, 1891), VI, 153· 
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his family at Giewitz and busied himself with the completion of the 
manuscript of his work, German~ and Federick William I[, which was 
published on April 13. In this tract, the King's friend summed up 
his attitude toward the revolution and his hopes for the future. He 
developed the idea of the Prussian King as the future leader and uni-
fier of Gennany. The advocate of German unification wrote: 
King Frederick William IV will unite himself and Prussia 
as well as the German Princes and their people to the 
greatest and holiest work that lies before us. He places 
this as the goal of all, for all, and to which all sacri-
fices must be made.2B 
On April 26, 1848, Radowitz asked to be relieved of his position 
in the Prussian service. He believed that this action was necessitated 
by the new strength of the republican forces and also wanted more time 
to devote to his writings. 29 It may seem that he failed to live up to 
his obligations to his King by this decision, but this is far from the 
truth. Radowitz continued to advise his friend in his customary 
manner through letters. He also believed, as has been discussed 
earlier, that once the forces of revolution had been unleashed little 
could be done to stop them. He further believed that with the revolu-
tion, the time for younger men to assume positions of responsibility 
had come. 
Radowitz had begun his career as an anny officer. Through his 
natural ability and because of the promotion of his immediate superior, 
he had assumed an important position in his native state of Hesse-
28itadowitz, Deutschland und Friedrich Wilhelm IV, Gesammelte 
Schriften, III, 'Z77. - -
29"Radowitz to King Frederick William IV," Hassel, Radowitz, 590. 
Kassel. When he fell out of favor, he was able to find a position in 
the Prussian service and continued to rise in positions of responsi-
bility in his adopted land owing to his friendship with the Crown 
Prince. Through his experiences in 1830 and as Prussian representa-
tive on the Military Committee of the German Confederation, Radowitz 
began to study political affairs and to develop a political theory. 
He also became well known through his talents as an author. Finally, 
in 1847, he made his first attempt to reform the German Confederation 
and to bring about unification. However, he met with failure because 
of the outbreak of the Revolution of 1848. When the revolution 
reached his adopted honeland, he was at first seized by doubts as to 
which course of action to take, and because of his belief in the power 
of a revolution once it had begun, he resigned his post. However, 
events soon opened to him a new platform from which to continue his 
work toward German unification, the Frankfurt National Assembly. 
CHAPTER II 
BAOOWITZ AT FRANKFURT 
Although Radowitz believed that the revolution had ended his 
career, it was actually only beginning. The revolution gave rise to 
the Frankfurt National Assembly, and this made it possible for him to 
continue and enlarge his work for a reform of the German Confederation. 
On March 5, 1848, a gathering of fifty-one men at Heidelberg issued a 
proclamation demanding the calling of a German National Assembly. On 
March 31, 574 delegates met in Frankfurt am Main as a Preparliament to 
make preparations for the election of the National Assembly. Most of 
those there assembled represented small south German states. Austria 
had sent only two men, while little Hesse-Darmstadt had sent eighty-
four. 
The previous appointment of the March ministers had also included 
the naming of replacements for the supporters of Metternich and his 
ideas in the Diet of the Confederation. These new men included Fried-
rich Christoph Dahlmann, a historian and one of the 11G8ttingen Seven" 
dismissed from their positions at the university because of their 
refusal to support the coup of King Ernst August of Hanover in 1837. 
Others were the poet Ludwig Uhland, Friedrich Daniel Bassermann, a 
leading supporter of German unification in the assembly of the Grand 
Duchy of Baden, and Georg Gervinus, editor of the liberal Deutsche 
Zeitung. The new, more progressive composition of the Diet made it 
,.,,., 
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possible for the supporters of the proposed National Assembly to ob-
tain its official approval of the project, thus giving the Assembly a 
1 legal mandate from the supreme organ of the old order. 
On May 16, Radowitz was informed of his election to the National 
Assembly by the voters of Amsberg-Ruthen, a Westphalian constituency. 
In the election, his support had come from Catholics, who approved 
• 
of him because of his religious attitudes, and from Protestants, who 
voted for Radowitz due to his well-known friendship with Frederick 
William IV. 2 When he heard that he had been elected to the Assembly 
by a mixed population, the elated delegate wrote to the King of his 
hopes to use this as a vehicle for a furtherance of his work for 
German unification.3 
After several false starts, the National Assembly convened on 
May 18, 1848, in St. Paul's Lutheran Church at Frankfurt. 4 - Before the 
men assembled in this first freely elected German parliament were 
placed all the problems that had arisen as a result of the revolution. 
The old German Confederation had for all practical purposes been 
destroyed; now the men at Frankfurt had to create a new Germany to re-
place it. This meant first that they had to decide who were to be 
1 Frank Eyck, ~ Frankfurt Parliament (New York: Macmillan, 
1969), 36-41. 
2Friedrich Meinecke, Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution 
(Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und'"Sohn, 1913), 79. 
311Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Giewitz, May 17, 1848," 
Nachgelassene Briefe, 45. 
4Franz Wigard, ed., Stenographischer Bericht Uber ~ Verhand-
lungen der deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt 
am Main~ vols., Frankfurt: Johann David Sauerlander, 1848-1849) 
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considered "Germans" and what areas should be included in the new state. 
They also had to define the roles of the old states and to decide 
whether or not they were even to remain in existence. Once this had 
been accomplished, the most important task before the National Assem-
bly was the erection of a new central government and a decision con-
cerning the form this government was to take: republican or monarch-
ial. Perhaps the most serious matter to be considered at Frankfurt 
was that of determining which of the two leading German states would 
lead the new Germany, Austria or Prussia. In short, the Frankfurt 
National Assembly was faced with the task of the creation of a new 
nation state on the ruins of the old discredited Confederation. 
When men gather to discuss political matters, they usually divide 
into factions or parties. The men in Frankfurt in the spring of 1848 
were no different; they formed political factions which were named 
according to their meeting places. The left wing, which emphasized 
the power of the people and had republican tendencies, met at the 
Deutscher Hof under the leadership of Robert Blum. However, as a 
result of internal quarrels, the Left split on May 28, when Franz 
Raveaux led his followers out of the Deutscher Hof to form the 
Donnersberg Club, or extreme Left. Both factions of the Left believed 
in the absolute right of the National Assembly to construct the new 
constitution. They differed in that the Deutscher Hof was willing to 
court the support of the Right center, or Casino party, through a less 
dogmatic interpretation of the importance of popular sovereignity, 
while the extreme Left refused to compromise with its principles. The 
Casino party consisted of men like Dahlmann, who desired the modifica-
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tion of existing German institutions rather than their destruction,5 
Radowitz, who had arrived in Frankfurt on June 20, was the leader 
of the right wing faction, or Steinernes Haus. The Prussian states-
man did not approve of the formation of parties at the Assembly, but 
felt it necessary to associate with men in agreement with his ideas, 
since the Left had already organized. 6 On June 6, a group of his 
followers formed a conservative society at the restaurant Steinernes 
Haus am Markte. 7 The use of the term "society" (Verein), instead of 
"party'' is an indication of its leader's opposition to the formation 
of political parties. The major plank in the platform of the Stein-
ernes Haus was the unification of Germany under a constitutional 
monarchy in which the states would retain a measure of their old 
•t• 8 posi ion. 
It would be a mistake to consider Radowitz and his friends reac-
tionaries, however. His plan for a revision of the Confederation in 
1847 shows that the leader of the Right realized the inadequacies of 
the old order and the importance of change. On June 23, he spoke on 
this matter before the Assembly: 
I ask you: who is a reactionary? • • • Is there any such 
party in Germany? It cannot be found in the Assembly; 
no one here is a reactionary. To be sure, Gentlemen, 
there are men here who have faithfully and sincerely 
served the old monarchies. However, they are not blind 
to their failures and have not attempted to hide all the 
faults of the police state. They know very well that only 
5Eyck, Parliament, 137-139· 
611Radowitz to his wife, Frankfurt, May 25, 1848," Nachgelassene 
Briefe, 51. 
7"Radowitz to his wife, Frankfurt, June 6, 1848," ibid., 53. 
~einecke, Radowitz, 103e 
a state based on justice is the true political order and 
carry this thought constantly in their hearts. They wish 
that the reorganization might follow the path of legality. 
They desire evolution, not revolution.9 
The formation of political parties at Frankfurt is much more 
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important than it may seem at first glance. The National Assembly was 
the first truly free all-German parliament, and the division into 
parties laid the foundations for the parties of the Bismarckian era 
and even for those of the present Gennan Federal Republic. 
In addition to his role as leader of the Right, Radowitz also be-
came the chief spokesman for the Roman Catholics. On June 14, he met 
with Melchoir von Diepenbrock and August Reichensperger to organize a 
society of Roman. Catholic members of the National Assembly• Radowitz 
was elected president of the newly fanned boa.y.10 Because he refused 
to support the conversion of the Catholic society into apolitical 
party, Radowitz was bitterly criticized. Wilhelm von Ketteler, who 
later as Bishop of Mainz became Bismarck's chief opponent during the 
Kulturkampf, accused the Prussian Catholic of harming the interests 
of the Church by tying it to those of Berlin.11 
One of the most important issues to be decided at Frankfurt was 
the position of the church in the new Germany. In Prussia and several 
other states, the Protestant Church was the established state religiop, 
while the Roman Catholic Church occupied a similar position in Austria 
and Bavaria. On August 24, the Assembly began discussions on Article 
III of the Basic Rights, provisions designed to establish religious 
9Wigard, Bericht, I, 478. 
1~einecke, Radowitz, 156. 
1~yck, Parliament, 145· 
freedom. Some members, such as Hennann von Beisler, opposed the 
article as being too vague; indeed, it was supported by both foes and 
friends of the Church. A few Protestants were afraid that a separa-
tion of church and state would weaken their religion. Wilhelm Weissborn 
answered this contention by arguing that religious compulsion was a 
part of the past and that the time had. come for the church to make ad-
justmentso Radowitz deplored the division between Catholics and Pro-
testants on the article, and pleaded that freedom of religion be con-
sidered in the same light as freedom of the press and other basic 
rights. In response to those who maintained that the church required 
state support in order to exist, he declared that no power on earth 
had the strength to destroy either the Protestant or Roman Catholic 
Churcheso He also assured the Protestants that the followers of his 
faith had no desire to use religious freedom as a pretext to introduce 
the hated Jesuit Order. The leader of the Catholic Society argued 
that the division of Gennany into rival Protestant and Catholic states 
as a result of the Peace of Westphalia in 164S was no longer valid. 
He ended his speech with a plea for freedom for every religious group 
no matter how large or smallo The debate ended with the passage of 
t . . 12 he article o 
In order to create a new Germany, the men at Frankfurt had to 
define what territories were to be included in jhe new state. One of 
the problems involved in this was the fate of the minorities living 
under Gennan governmentss One such minority was the Czech population 
living under the Habsburg Empire in the Kingdom of Bohemia. Bohemia 
12wigard, Bericht, III, 1662-1772. 
2S 
had become a Habsburg possession in the sixteenth century and was 
populated by both the Slavic Czechs and the Germans living in the 
Sudetenland. " Czech nationalism, growing out of the religious refonns 
of John Huss, was very strong. The attempts of the Czechs to achieve 
a greater degree of independence had been one of the chief causes of 
the Thirty Years' War. After the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, 
the Czechs were defeated and forced to accept German rule.13 In the 
nineteenth century, this nationalism experienced a rebirth, thus 
leading to a conflict between the German and Czech Bohemians. 
Instead of responding to the call to elect delegates to the 
National Assembly in Frankfurt, the Czech nationalists held a Slavic 
Congress at Prague. Its organizers issued a decree on May 1 calling 
for the unification of all Slavic peoples into a state of their own. 
The Slavic Congress opened on June 2, and passed a resolution de-
manding that the nationalities problem be submitted to a general 
European conference for solution. It also issued a demand that the 
Slavs living in German states be granted self-determination. An up-
rising in Prague on June 12, which many Germans believed was an out-
growth of the passions aroused by the Congress, temporarily halted its 
proceedings.14 Since Bohemia was under the rule of a German prince 
and had a substantial German population, the problems posed by the 
Slavic Congress were of prime importance to the men at Frankfurt. The 
nationalist element among the delegates saw the question in terms of 
German versus Slav. They believed that the granting of the Czech 
13 . Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1214 (New York: 
The Norton Library, 1951), 6-16. 
1~yck, Parliament, 70, 160-161. 
demands would result in the persecution of the Sudetenland Germans. 
The debate at Frankfurt began on July 1, with Radowitz arguing 
that the Germans should not allow the six hundred-year association of 
Bohemia with the German Reich to be destroyed. He believed that the 
Assembly should wait for the Austrian officials to indicate their 
positions towards the Slavic Congress before taking any independent 
action. The leader of the Right stated, however, that the Habsburg 
government had a duty to see to it that the elections for the 
Assembly were held in Bohemia, and that if Austria should request 
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help from other German states, the Assembly should give it without 
hesitation. After the debate ended, the men at St. Paul's Church voted 
to approve the plan suggested by Radowitz.15 
The next national question to be considered at Frankfurt was the 
Polish problem as it related to the mixed German-Polish Duchy of Posen .• 
During the partitions of Poland by Austria, Prussia, and Russia from 
1772 to 1795, Posen had been awarded to the Hohenzolle:rn Kingdom. 
However, it was not included in the German Confederation of 1815. On 
March 2.4, 1848, Frederick William IV appointed a German-Polish com-
mission to reorganize the gove:rnment of the Duchy. The Germans, 
feeling threatened by the possibility of Polish domination, demanded 
the inclusion of Posen in the German Confederation. The Prussian King 
decided to compromise between the Poles and German inhabitants of the 
territory by dividing it into several areas. Those sections with a 
German majority would become members of the Confederation. However, 
this measure failed to meet the demands of the Poles, who felt that 
l5Wigard, Bericht, I, 666-667. 
Posen should be treated as a completely Polish area. They also ob-
jected when the German National Assembly assigned twelve delegates 
to represent the contested territory.16 
Naturally, the controversy found its way into the discussions at 
Frankfurt. On May 22, the Polish National Committee sent a formal 
protest against the proposed elections of delegates to Frankfurt on 
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the grounds that Posen had not been a part of the German Confederation 
prior to 1848. Jacob Venedey, of the Left, presented a motion denying 
the right of the representatives of the Duchy to participate in the 
Assembly. After a series of debates and conflicting motions, the 
Assembly approved the recommendations of the President, Heinrich von 
Gagern, to refer the matter to the credentials committee for further 
consideration.17 On June 24, the committee reported its recommenda-
tions. The report charged that the Polish nationalists sought to re-
store Poland to its pre-1772 boundaries, thus placing about two million 
Germans under Polish domination. To avoid this, the committee proposed 
the division of the Duchy into counties (Kreisen). Those counties with 
a German majority would become a part of the German Reich •18 The 
Committee's report was followed with a long debate on the subject. 
On the second day of the debate, Radowitz rose to speak on the 
issue. He first deplored the attempts of some members of the Assembly 
to introduce the religious controversy into the issue, thus turning it 
into a quarrel between Catholics and Protestants. The leader of the 
16Eyck, Parliament, 269. 
l7Wigard, Bericht, I, 196-229. 
18Ibid. , II, 1127. 
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Right demanded that the Posen question be considered solely in legal 
terms and not as a confessional matter. He stated that the separation 
of Posen from Germany would force many Germans to live under Polish 
domination, thus giving rise to a serious injustice. He also opposed 
the reestablishment of a Polish state as being against Germany's best 
interests. However, he also felt that it would be equally unjust to 
force Poles to live under German domination. He concluded his speech 
with a statement in support of the recommendations of the committee,19 
Thus, Radowitz took a moderate position on the Posen question and re-
fused to support the extreme views of either the German or Polish 
nationalists. 
The debate ended with a series of votes on the issue.· The 
Assembly rejected a motion by Robert Blum to send a special commission 
to Posen to investigate the matter further. Radowitz voted with a 
majority of 333 against 139· Next, they voted 342 to 31 to recognize 
the incorporation into the German Reich of those areas proposed for 
inclusion by the Prussian government. Radowitz voted with the majority 
on the measure. They also approved the demarcation line between the 
Polish and German sections of Posen as drawn by Berlin with a stipula-
tion that a final investigation take place before implementation. 
Next, a motion by Prince Felix Lichnowsky calling for Berlin to agree 
to protect the rights of her Polish subjects was approved. Finally, 
the Assembly rejected by a vote of 331 to 101 a resolution to the ef-
fect that it was "the holy duty of Germans to work for the re-creation 
of Poland." Naturally, Radowi tz voted against this proposal. 20 
19 ..... . 
. Ibid.' 1155-1156. 
' I 
20Ibid., 1226-1247. 
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The final minority group living under a Gennan ruler to be con-
sidered at Frankfurt were the Italians of South Tyrol. At first, the 
Italian population of this Habsburg territory refused to elect repre-
sentatives to the National Assembly, though Baron Giovanni, a Roman 
Catholic priest, conducted a campaign in support of the Assembly. 
After the defeat of an uprising in Tione, the people of Trent realized 
that Vienna would never relinquish control of South Tyrol without a 
fight, which the Italians realized they could not win. So they elected 
21 four men to go to Frankfurt. However, other areas of Habsburg Italy 
were not so cooperative. In Lombardy and Venetia, under Austrian rule 
since the Congress of Vienna, the people rose in revolt on March 18. 
Five days later, King Charles Albert of Sardinia-Piedmont marched his 
army into Lombardy, thus beginning a war between his small state and 
. 22 the Habsburg Empire. 
The National Assembly began discussions on the Italian question 
on August 12. After some debate, they voted against a separation of 
Trent and Roveredo from the German Reich. Radowitz proposed that the 
German Provisional Government, which had been established by the 
Assembly, offer its services to mediate between the belligerent powers. 
He believed that the war in Italy was of national importance and that 
if Austria lost control over northern Italy, it would open the way for 
French hegemony in Italy, thus posing a serious threat to Germany's 
southern boundaries. He also stated that a loss of Venice would en-
danger the Dalmatian coast and Trieste, both areas necessary for Ger-
2~yck, Parliament, 74, 
22aobinson, Revolutions, 346. 
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man security. For these reasons, he advocated the retention of the 
German hold on northern Italy. His speech was loudly applauded by the 
Right and Center. After the conclusion of the debate, the Assembly 
voted to pass these motions to the Provisional Government for con-
sideration. 23 
After disposing of the problems posed by non-Germans living under 
a German ruler, the Assembly found itself faced with the problem of a 
German majority under a non-Gennan ruler, the Schleswig-Holstein ques-
tion. Owing to claims dating as far back as the Middle Ages, the 
Danish King was also Duke of Schleswig. During the territorial settle-
ments following the Napoleonic wars, Holstein was awarded to the King 
of Denmark as partial compensation for the loss of Norway and Sweden. 
Since Holstein had a completely German population, it became a part of 
the German Confederation, while Schleswig, with its mixed Danish-
German population remained outside this body. 24 On March 24, 1848, the 
Germans in the Duchies revolted and fanned a provisional government in 
response to the announcement from Copenhagen of the incorporation of 
Schleswig into the Danish state. Heinrich von Arnim, the Prussian 
Foreign Minister, recognized the provisional government and sent 
General Friedrich von Wrangel with troops in support. This led to a 
war between Prussia and the Nordic kingdom. Because of the interven-
tion of Sweden, the effectiveness of the Danish blockade, and the pro-
tests of Russia and England, Prussia was forced to sue for peace and 
conclude an armistice at Malm8, Sweden, on August 26. In the truce, 
23Wigard, Bericht, II, 1560-1568. 
24tawrence D. Steefel, ~ Schleswig-Holstein guestion (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1932), 4. 
Prussia agreed to end its recognition of the provisional government 
and to place the Duchies under a mixed commission dominated by the 
Danes. 25 
34 
Radowitz was well aware of the Schleswig-Holstein problem. In 
1846, he had written an article entitled, "Who Succeeds in Schleswig?" 
In this, he traced the claims of the Danish royal family to the Duchy 
back to 1110, but ~ited historical evidence to prove the unification of 
Schleswig with Holstein rather than Denmark. He also stated that 
the Schleswig succession, along with that of Holstein, was rightfully 
through the male line rather than through the female line as recog-
nized in the Danish law of succession. 26 
On September 4, the Frankfurt National Assembly began its dis-
cussion on the Schleswig-Holstein question. The Reichsminister 
Johann Gustav Heckscher read the provisions of the Malm8 agreement. 
After a fiery debate, the matter was referred to a special committee 
with instructions to report the next day. However, the committee was 
unable to reach agreement. The majority, speaking through Friedrich 
Christoph Dahlmann, opposed the endorsement of the truce. He was sup-
ported by the Left, which believed that Germany had an obligation to 
fight for the rights of the Germans in the Duchies. The Right, led 
by Radowitz, favored the armistice. The leader of the conservative 
forces stated that the question was of European importance and that a 
failure at negotiations could lead to a general war which would do 
great harm to Germany. In his arguments, he cited the strength of the 
25Holborn, Modern Germany, III, 55, 65-67. 
26Radowitz, "Wer Ebt in Schleswig?," Gesammelte SchriftenL III, 
167-194. 
Danish fleet and the fact that the provisions of the final peace were 
still to be decided. His speech was greeted with cheers from the 
Right and hisses from the Left and galleries. The leader of the 
Steinernes Haus faction supported a motion calling for a postponement 
of action by the Assembly until agreement could be reached on the 
final terms of peace. This failed, and a motion by Dahlmann against 
the Malm8 armistice passed by a vote of 238 to 221.. Radowitz voted 
with the minority. However, this action did not stand. After a 
serious crisis caused by the resignation of the Ministry and the 
failure of attempts to form a new one, the Assembly reversed its de-
cision by a vote on September 16.Zl 
The Assembly's ratification provoked violent opposition. Riots 
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broke out in Frankfurt, where the people erected barricades to protest 
the decision. With the approval. of the Assembly, and the Frankfurt 
Senate, Anton von Schmerling, Minister of the Interior, sent for 
troops from the federal fortress at Mainz to protect St. Paul's 
28 ' Church. However, a group of protestors was able to break through 
the military cordon and storm the church. After they had gotten 
through one of the doors, Heinrich von Gagern shouted, "I declare every 
transgressor against this holy place a traitor to the Fatherland," and 
the startled mob turned back. 29 The unrest continued and reached a 
climax with the mob murder of Prince Felix Lichnowsk.y, who had been 
mistaken by some members of the crowd for Radowitz. 30 The violence 
2'7wigard, Bericht, III, 1857-2149· 
28Ibid., 2163-2027. 
29Eyck, Parliament, 312. 
30Robinson, Revolutions, 160. 
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made a deep impression on the leader of the Right. He witnessed from 
his window the storming of a barricade by some Prussian troops and 
wrote his wife of his strong desire to join them. 31 When the National 
Assembly, itself a product of the revolution, was forced to call upon 
the troops of the old order to protect it from the very people it 
claimed to represent, its weaknesses became quite apparent. 
In addition to the nationalities question, Assembly was faced 
with the important task of creating a provisional government to rule 
Germany while it completed its work of writing the new constitution. 
The debate over this issue is very important to an understanding of 
Rad.owitz's political philosophy. During this discussion, the men at 
Frankfurt decided upon the position of the old German states in the 
new order. They began debate on June 19. The representatives of 
the Left took the position that the revolution had destroyed the im-
portance of the states, and therefore the power to create a new gov-
ernment for Germany rested solely in the hands of the National 
Assembly. 32 
On the first day of the debate, Radowitz defined his ideas on the 
future of Germany. He stated that the German people would not allow 
the destruction of their states. He believed that Germany had two sets 
of interests: regional and local matters, represented by the states, 
and national concerns. The leader of the Right advocated that in the 
future Germany the national interests should be served by a House of 
Commons and those of local importance by a House of the States. Since 
3~einecke, Radowitz, 149· 
3~yck, Parliament, 174. 
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the present structure of Germany failed to provide for this, he be-
lieved that the state governments should be given the power to name 
the provisional government. Radowitz argued that this would not mean 
that all power would be given to the princes instead of the people; it 
would simply provide that control would be in the hands of the indi-
vidual states instead of the national government. 33 Hi'S position on 
the issue reveals Radowitz as a moderate. He supported the formation 
of a national government, but he also realized the importance of the 
old German states. 
After Radowitz had completed his speech, the debate continued. 
On June 21, George von Vincke proposed that a Federal Director be 
named by the states and that this officer govern Germany while the 
drafting of the constitution was underway. The next day Radowitz spoke 
in favor of this proposal. He opposed the creation of an executive 
committee as advocated by Ludwig Simon and the Le;ft. Instead, the 
leader of the Right favored naming one man as head of state. On 
June 'Zl, Heinrich von Gagern intervened in the debate with a bold 
affirmation of the authority of the Assembly to create the provisional 
government. His statement was met with loud shouts of approval. He 
also recommended that the head of the provisional government should 
be a prince who would serve as Imperial Regent. 34 This would mean 
that the National Assembly would take upon itself full authority to 
govern Germany without any interference from the states. It would also 
mean that the Assembly would commit itself to a monarchy, since Gagern 
33wigard, Bericht, I, 375-376. 
3~id., 444, 479, 521-522. 
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wanted a prince to become Regent and thus eliminate the possibility of 
a republican solution to the German problem. Most important, Gagern' s 
suggestion ended a deadlock that might have lasted for weeks or even 
months. 
The Assembly then began to vote on the issue. The forces of the 
Right, including Radowitz, attempted to soften the blow to the tradi-
tional power of the States through a motion that would have made the 
Assembly's actions on the provisional government subject to the approval 
of the states. This was defeated by a vote of 31 to 577, a division 
which showed the relative strength of the Right in St. Paul's Church. 
Later, Radowitz voted with the majority against an attempt by the 
Left to abolish the National Assembly after the creation of the pro-
visional government. This was followed by a motion granting the 
provisional government the authority to declare war and peace and ne-
gotiate treaties with foreign powers with the approval of the National 
Assembly, thus depriving the states of one of the major symbols of 
sovereignty. Radowitz, acting in his role as leader of the Right, 
rose to object to the consideration of this motion on the grounds that 
the members of his party had not been given prior notice of its con-
sideration at that time. He was overruled, and the proposal was ap-
proved by a vote of 408 to 14.3. True to his strong belief in German 
unification, Radowitz voted with the majority • .35 
Radowitz remained a strong supporter of the rights of the German 
states, however, and opposed a motion which would have empowered the 
head of the provisional government to name a prime minister. This 
.35Ibid., 576-602. 
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passed by a vote of 408 to 143· He also dissented when the Assembly 
gave itself the right to elect an Imperial Regent by a vote of 403 to 
135· Division over the issue continued the next day with the passage 
of a measure making the Regent independent of the Assembly. This had 
the effect of not only rendering the Regent independent but curtailed 
the Assembly's powers as well. It also meant that the provisional 
government would not become a parliamentary democracy; it would remain 
a monarchy with the Imperial Regent in the position of sovereign. In 
the next vote, the Assembly dissolved the Diet of the German Confedera-
tion by a vote of 510 to 35, thus eradicating the last remains of the 
old order. True to his position as leader of the Right, Radowitz op-
posed this action. However, when the division on the creation of a 
central authority began, in a grand effort to preserve the unity of the 
Assembly, he rose to call for its passage. The law passed by a vote 
of 450 to 100. On June 20, Archduke John of Austria was elected 
Imperial Regent, and his elevation to this position was greeted with 
cheers, the ringing of church bells, and the firing of a cannon. 36 
After dealing with the nationalities problem and erecting a 
provisional government, the men at Frankfurt had before them the de-
cision on the role of the Habsburg Empire in the new German state. The 
lands ruled from Vienna included a number of non-German areas, such as 
Hungary, Slovenia, Galicia, and Croatia. It was necessary to reach 
an agreement on the relationship between these non-German territories 
and the new German state. One faction favored a greater Germany which 
would include most if not all of the Habsburg lands. This was the 
36Ibid., 576-638. 
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Grossdeutsch Party. The other, or Kleindeutsch Party, favored the 
exclusion of the Danubian Monarchy from Germany, thus making it 
possible for Prussia to assume German leadership. 
Radowitz, as his work before the Frankfurt National Assembly 
indicates, was a strong supporter of Prussian leadership over Germany. 
He believed that the Hohenzollern Kingdom, as a true German state and 
a European power, was the natural head of the German nation, rather than 
the multinational Habsburg Empire. 37 After a long debate, the 
Assembly voted 340 to 76 to prohibit the union under one government of 
a part of the German nation with a non-German area. They also accepted 
by a large majority a proposal which provided a German state under the 
same ruler as a non-German one could only be united in personal union. 38 
Radowitz did not participate in the debate or the vote, however, since 
he had left Frankfurt on September 23 for Mecklenburg in order to 
assist his family's move to Wetzlar.39 
The decision of the National Assembly to ban the inclusion of 
non-German areas in the new German Reich placed it on the side of the 
advocates of Prussian hegemony and automatically ruled out any further 
Austrian support of its activitieso After playing a major role in 
German affairs for several hundered years, the Habsburgs refused to 
acquiesce to their exclusion from Germany. After the victory of the 
counterrevolutionary forces in Austria during the fall of 1848, Prince 
Felix von Schwarzenberg had been appointed Prime Minister. On Novem-
37"Privataufzeichnung von Radowitz, Sept. 11, 1848," Nachgelassene 
Briefe, 60-63. 
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ber Z?, he announced to a meeting of the Austrian Diet at Kremsier 
that the unification of the Habsburg lands was a matter of both German 
and European necessity.40 
With this decision on the future of Austria, the National Assembly 
could now turn to its most important work, the drafting of a constitu-
tion. On January 17, 1849, the Constitutional Committee submitted its 
report, but owing to its inability to agree, the membership was divided 
into two groups. One favored a hereditary emperor, while the other 
wanted government by an Imperial Directory. The Directory was to con-
sist of five members, including the Austrian Emperor, the Kings of 
Prussia and Bavaria, a member chosen by the Kings of Hanover, Saxony 
and wll.rttemberg and the Grand Duke of Baden, and a representative of 
the remaining German princes. 41 The Hereditary Emperor Party supported 
the candidacy of Frederick William IV of Prussia as head of the German 
Reich. Naturally, Radowitz sided with this group. He had advanced 
this idea to his friend as early as six months previously. On January 
5, he wrote the King, "When Germany' s princes and people call you to 
this throne, I will pull your carriage on my shoulders to old St. 
Bartholomew's Cathedral," the former coronation site of the Holy Roman 
Emperors.42 The Assembly debated the issue from January 17 until 
March Z?, when it voted 267 to 263 in favor of the establishment of 
40Heinrich von Sybel, ~Founding 2f. the German Empire ~William 
I (trans. by Marshall Livingston Perrin and Gamaliel Bradford, Jr., 6 
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the office of hereditary Emperor. The next day they elected Frederick 
William IV to this position; Radowitz voted for his friend. A dele-
gation of twenty-four was sent to inform the King of his selection, 
and the Assembly turned to the drafting of the constitution.43 
The constitution adopted at Frankfurt created a unified German 
state under the leadership of the Emperor and a bicameral Parliament. 
The Emperor was to have the authority to appoint the ministry and 
all diplomatic personnel, to call the Parliament into session, and to 
order its dissolution. He was also head of the armed forces and had 
the power to proclaim and enforce laws. The upper house of the 
Parliament was called the House of States. Half of its membership was 
to be appointed by the state governments, and the remainder by the 
state parliaments. Elections for half of the membership would be held 
every three years, and the delegates would serve for six-year terms. 
The lower house, or House of the People, would be elected to three-
year terms by universal manhood suffrage and secret ballot. Legisla-
tion had to receive the approval of both houses, and the Emperor had 
the right to veto, but this could be overridden by three successive 
sessions of the Parliament. The constitution also established a 
supreme court.44 Thus, the National Assembly had created a unified 
German state in which the interests of the states were protected by the 
House of the States and those of the people by the lower house. 
However, events outside Frankfurt determined the fate of the new 
constitution. On March 7, the Austrian Diet at Kremsier created a 
43Wigard, Bericht, IX, 6084-6096. 
~yck, Parliament, 378-380. 
united Habsburg state instead of the personal union demanded by the 
National Assembly. The Habsburg Court refused to recognize the 
authority of the men at st. Paul's Church to expel it from Gennan 
affairs. The government sent a note to Frankfurt rejecting the con-
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stitution and demanding its amendment in accordance with its demands. 
The Austrians also refused to ;recognize the election of Frederick 
William as the head of the Gennan Empire. Instead, they proposed that 
Germany be ruled by a seven-member directory under a Habsburg presi-
dent. In the Austrian plan, the Parliament was to be replaced by a 
chamber of seventy members elected by the state governments. 45 
Since Austria refused to accept the constitution, its fate was 
placed in the hands of King Frederick William IV. The Prussian King 
had several alternatives. He coUld accept the crown and risk a major 
war with Austria and her supporters among the Gennan states; he could 
reject it outright; or he could temporize and wait for a solution to 
present itself. He chose the last possibility. Radowitz, like his 
friend, was beset by doubts concerning his position. He could have 
rushed to Berlin to be at the King's side, but he preferred to remain 
at his post in Frankfurt and put his recommendations in writing as 
he had done in the past and would continue to do throughout his years 
of service to the Prussian monarch. On March· 13, 1849, he outlined 
his thoughts on the subject in a letter to the King. He realized that 
an open break with Austria might lead to war but maintained that the 
Habsburg Monarchy had isolated herself from Gennany, The King's 
45Sybel, ~Founding 2f. ~ Gennan. E!!!J?i.re, I, 340-341. 
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friend refrained from advising him on what course to take, explaining 
that he was not fully informed on the attitudes of the Austrian 
government.46 
Like Radowitz, the King was confused as to which alternative to 
choose. In spite of his friend's uncertain advice, Frederick William 
needed him in Berlin.47 The Hohenzollern monarch questioned seriously 
the right of the men at Frankfurt to grant him the imperial crown; he 
would have preferred to receive it from the hands of the German 
princes. On April 3, he met with the representatives of the Assembly. 
He did not actually reject the crown, but informed them that before he 
could accept it, the constitution must be approved by the German 
states. 48 This apparent refusal was not really unreasonable. It 
should be remembered that even in the United States the constitution 
required the ratification of the states before it could go into 
effect. Nevertheless, the King's statement was interpreted by the 
delegation as a rejection. After this, the Assembly went into a 
swift decline. Many members, including Radowitz, left Frankfurt, and 
finally a Rump Parliament convened at Stuttgart was dissolved by 
troops on June 18.49 
The reasons for the failure of the Frankfurt National Assembly 
were manifold and varied. The men at St. Paul's Church had no real 
power to force the adoption of their constitution. The Assembly could 
4611Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Frankfurt, March 13, 1849,". 
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debate and adopt motions as much as it wished, but it had no army. In 
Germany in 1848, he who controlled the army controlled the nation. The 
states possessed the troops and refused to use them to support their 
own destruction as semi-independent entities. The Assembly had also 
alienated the German revolutionaries by its decision to support the 
Malm8 Armistice; it could not now call upon them for support against 
the states. In reality, the National Assembly had adopted a moderate 
solution to the German problem, and in doing so had alienated both the 
German states and the revolutionaries. 
Likewise, from a study of his work at Frankfurt, Radowitz 
emerges as a moderate. He was the leader of the Right, but refused 
to support a reaction that would reinstate the old order and its inef-
fective Confederation. He fought for the establishment of a monarchy 
and the retention of the position of the states, but at the same time 
he was willing to work for the erection of a freely elected Parlia-
ment as a voice for the German people. On April 23, he received a 
letter from the Prussian Prime Minister, Count Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Brandenburg,50 recalling him to Berlin. 
Radowitz viewed the results of the National Assembly with mixed 
emotions. He was deeply disturbed by the factionalism and long argu-
ments at Frankfurt which had dela~d the decisions on the constitution 
until the time for effective action had passed. 51 He did not feel that 
the Assembly had been a total failure, however. He was pleased with 
the foundations for unification laid by the constitution and incor-
50Meinecke, Radowitz, 229. 
5lWigard, Bericht, VIII, 5807. 
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porated a revised version of this document in his own work in 1849 and 
1850. It is clear that he would have preferred the acceptance of the 
constitution and of Frederick William IV as Emperor, but was too 
realistic to expect such a thing in the face of such strong Austrian 
opposition. In the next chapter of his career, Radowitz carried on 
his fight for German unification through other channels. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ERFURT PARLIAMENT 
The failure of the Frankfurt National Assembly left a political 
vacuum in Germany. The revolution had destroyed the old German Con-
federation of 1815, and the attempts at Frankfurt to replace it with a 
unified German constitutional state had been in vain. To the question 
as to what would replace the old order, three alternatives presented 
themselves: the reestablishment of the defunct Confederation; the 
creation of a republic, as advanced by the radical elements; or the 
unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. This third option 
was that which Radowitz favored, and for his efforts to achieve this 
goal he has been criticized from several sides. Bismarck, a represen-
tative of the reactionary Junker class, accused him of deliberately 
trying to lead the Hohenzollern Kingdom to humiliation either from a 
desire to harm the Protestant cause or else as a result of his selfish 
determination to curry the favor of Frederick William IV regardless of 
the consequences. Others, such as the historian Veit Valentin, have 
charged that Radowitz was wholly out of touch with reality owing to 
his strong romantic leanings.1 These judgments lead one to seek the 
real motivations of Radowitz and explain why his actions were inde-
1otto von Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen (2 vols., Berlin: 
J. s. Cottaxche Buchhandlung, 1915),I, 84; Valentin, Deutsche 
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cisive and ultimately unsuccessful. This chapter represents an attempt 
to analyze his actions from the conclusion of the Frankfurt National 
Assembly until the end of the Erfurt Parliament in order to determine 
the answer to these questions. 
After his participation in the unsuccessful meeting at Frankfurt, 
Radowitz returned to Berlin disillusioned and chastened. He wrote his 
wife that he felt like a soldier who had gone into battle with the 
foreknowledge of certain defeat. 2 He had seen his high hopes in the 
possibilities of the Assembly crumble.into dust. He had also met with 
defeat in his earlier efforts to bring about a reform in the Confedera-
tion in 1847. Thus, in April, 1849, without any idea of what lay 
before him, he returned to the Prussian capital. 
Upon his arrival in Berlin, he m~de one final effort to save the 
fruits of the National Assembly. On April 26, he met with Count 
Brandenburg, the Prime Minister, and Frederick W:id.liam IV. Radowitz 
proposed three possible solutions to the conflict between Berlin and 
Frankfurt. First, Prussia could break completely with the Assembly 
and dictate a German constitution from above. Secondly, the Hohen-
zollern Kingdom could appeal directly to the Gerrnan people. And 
finally, Berlin could reach an understanding with the middle. German 
states while coming to some sort of separate agreement with Aust:r:ia. 
Both Brandenburg and the King entertained serious doubts as to which 
alternatives to choose. Four days later, the ministry met to discuss 
the issue. In the debate over the problem, Radowitz championed the 
last alternative, arguing that since the men at Frankfurt had taken 
211 Radowitz to his wife, Eisenach, April 24, 1849," Nachgelassene 
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the initiative and drafted a constitution, the ministry should act to 
unite Germany on the basis of a strong executive power with a legis-
lature consisting of a House of States and a House of the People. He 
also emphasized the importance of reaching an accord with the Habsburg 
Empire. 3 Because the King and his ministers considered other matters, 
such as the revolts in the Rhineland, more pressing, action was de-
ferred, however. 
Emboldened by this delay, the champion of German unification 
decided on the necessity of immediate action. On May 5, he met with 
the King, who proposed the restoration of the defunct Holy Roman 
Empire with the Habsburg Emperor as Kaiser and the Prussian King as 
chief of the military.4 ·This plan was most impractical. The revolu-
tion had unleashed forces that would never settle for this solution. 
The men of 1848 had fought to create a strong unified nation and would 
never accept the linkage of German fortunes with those of the multi-
national Habsburg Empire. Also, the possibility of Austrian approval 
of the King's program was most remote. 
The idea of the resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire did not 
even win acceptance from the Prussian ministry. Instead, the ministry 
instructed Radowitz to draft a proposed plan of.union. He based his 
proposal on the constitution created at Frankfurt and upon his consul-
tations with members of the ministry and the King. On May 1.3, the 
fruits of his work were presented to the ministry. After two days of 
J"Diary," April 26 and .30, 1849, ibid., 83--84. 
4Ibid. 
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discussion it was accepted. 5 The proposed constitution was to be sub-
mitted to a conference of representatives of the German states which 
had been called to assemble at Potsdam. This approach was very 
realistic. The real power in Germany was held by the states, .and any 
solution to the German problem would have to meet with their approval. 
The plenipotentiaries gathered under Radowitz's leadership on 
May 17, but only Hanover, represented by Johann sttlve, Saxony, repre-
sented by von Beust, and Bavaria, represented by Gustav Lerchenfeld, 
responded to the Prussian invitation. The other twenty-nine German 
states replied that events no longer justified the convening of a 
conference. Anton von Prokes ch, the Austrian Minister to the Hohen-
zollern court, attended the first meeting but at the second informed 
Radowitz that his country could not participate. Yet Radowitz per-
severed. The Prussian representative proposed that a German Union be 
founded on the basis of an executive power consisting of a council of 
sovereigns and a bicameral diet. 6 The deliberations lasted for nine 
sessions, and on May 26, after an all-night session, Prussia, Hanover, 
and Saxony agreed to the Prussian proposals and formed the league of 
Three Kings. Bavaria, which had participated in the consultations, 
announced that she would reserve judgment on her decision concerning 
joining the Leaguee7 
Four days later, the proposed constitution of the League was made 
public. The Imperial Government was to consist of a Council of Princes 
511 niary, 11 May 4, 5, and 6, 1849, ibid., 90, 92. 
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and a bicameral diet. Executive power would rest in the hands of the 
Council of Princes under the presidency of the King of Prussia or, in 
his absence, the King of Bavaria. The membership of this body was to 
consist of six voting members, Prussia and Bavaria each had one vote. 
wUrttemberg, Baden, and the two Hohenzollern principalities would share 
a vote, while Saxony, the Saxon Duchies, Reuss, Anhalt, and Schwarz-
burg would also share a voting member. Hanover, Brunswick; Oldenburg, 
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Holstein were combined 
for the purpose of representation. The Hansa towns shared a vote, and 
finally Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, Hesse-Homburg, Limburg, 
Waldeck, Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe and Frankfurt am Main divided a voting 
member between them. The Council would have the power to conduct all 
diplomatic correspondence, declare war, negotiate treaties, and to 
prepare legislation for submission to the Diet. 8 
The legislative power was to be invested in the Federal Diet, 
consisting of a House of the People and a House of the States. The 
House of the people was to be elected by all males over the age of 
twenty-five, and delegates represented districts having a population 
of 100,000 as determined by the latest census. The method of election 
was indirect. The House of States, or Senate, was to consist of 160 
members. Prussia was entitled to forty representatives, Bavaria 
II twenty, Saxony, Hanover, and Wurttemberg twelve, Baden ten, Hesse-Kassel 
and_ Hesse-Darmstadt seven, Luxemburg three, Nassau four, Oldenburg, 
Brunswick, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach two, and the remaining states each had 
one. One-half of the membership of the House of States was to be 
811Prussia, 11 ~Times (London), June 4, 1849, 6. 
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elected by the state governments and the other half by the state diets. 
Those states sending one man to the House would choose their delegate 
by having the state government select one of three candidates nominated 
by the state diet. Members of the Federal Diet were required to be at 
least thirty years old. 9 
After Radowitz had supported the election of Frederick William IV 
as Emperor of Germany at the Frankfurt National Assembly, it may seem 
strange that he made no substantial attempt to preserve this feature 
of the Frankfurt Constitution during the negotiations of the League of 
Three Kings. The reason for this change lies in the fact that he was 
realistic enough to realize that the other German states would never 
accept giving this much power to the Hohenzollern King. In fact, 
Saxony and Hanover had reservations about even placing Frederick 
William IV in the presidency of the Council of Princes.10 
In accord with Radowitz's views of their importance, the power of 
the states was protected by several features of the proposed consti-
tution. The House of the States, through the election of its member-
ship by the state governments, was the major source of this pr6tection. 
The power of the states was also protected by the representation of 
their governments in the Council of Princes. However, the states were 
also limited by Ra.dowitz' s constitution. The most important symbol of 
sovereignty, the right to carry on diplomatic relations with foreign 
powers, was reserved to the Federal Government. Thus, the League would 
create a unified Germany while preserving the position of the German 
9Ibid. 
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states. 
The limited grants of power to the people also reveal Radowitz's 
political philosophy. While universal manhood suffrage was a part of 
the constitution, the method of indirect election and the position of 
the House of the People combined to limit the actual force of the 
German people in the League. Radowitz and his fellow ministers were 
willing to allow the electorate to get its foot in the door but stopped 
short of giving it full entrance to the governance of Germany. 
A very important aspect of the League which was eventually to 
contribute to its failure was the omission of a role for the Habsburg 
Empire. Even at Frankfurt, the way had been opened for Austrian par-
ticipation in German affairs, albeit in a very limited fashion. In 
the League of Three Kings, Austria was assigned the position of a 
foreign state. This would place Germany under Prussian leadership, 
end several hundred years of Habsburg dominance over German affairs, and 
alienate the Danubian Monarchy. 
At first, the League seemed to be a success. On June 6, the King 
of Saxony announced its acceptance by his kingdom. The same day the 
Bavarian monarch indicated that he would seriously consider the pro-
posal, if Prussia would agree to assist in the suppression of the re-
bellion in Saxony. On June 28, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach sent its repre-
sentative to Berlin to announce its adherence to the League. By July 
20, the two Mecklenburgs, Oldenburg, the Saxon duchies, the Hessian 
states, Anhalt, and Anhalt-Dessau-K8then had joined. On September 6, 
the Prussian Government announced that the remaining German states had 
fourteen days to reply to the invitation to become a part of the 
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League.11 
During this time, Radowitz was working in Berlin for the success 
of his program. The single most crucial matter to be taken into con-
sideration was the position of the Habsburg Empire toward the League. 
In an effort to reach an agreement with the other German power, Foreign 
Minister Karl von Canitz was sent to Vienna. Here he discovered that 
Austria refused to consider herself outside of German affairs and that 
the Habsburg Court still regarded Archduke John the Imperial Vicar. 
Austrian insistence on the retention of power by the Archduke was a 
method of gaining time in order to keep Prussia from seizing control 
of Germany while the Habsburgs were occupied with'.internal problems. 
The government at Vienna took the position that before any discussion 
on the German question could take place, the last remnants of the 
revolution must be crushed. General Leopold von Gerlach, who had been 
sent to Munich, found a similar attitude at the Wittelsbach Court. He 
attributed this to influence exercised by agents of the Austrian gov-
ernment. Accordingly, he reported to Radowitz that Bavaria could be 
considered in agreement with Vienna. From Warsaw, August von Rochow 
reported that the Austrian position had received the support of 
Tsar Nicholas I.12 
In spite of her internal problems, Austria did make some effort to 
reach an understanding with the Prussians. On September 6, Vienna 
proposed that the two German powers join in the formation of a new 
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confederation consisting of the former members of the defunct German 
Confederation. The Habsburg overture prompted a secret meeting be-
tween the heads of the two states at Troephitz, Bohemia, which, however, 
had no tangible results. On September 17, Canitz reported to his 
superiors that his mission had been a failure. Among the sources of 
friction between the two German powers was a difference in the text 
of the constitution published at Berlin and that presented to the Habs-
burg authorities. This caused some Austrian newspapers to charge the 
Prussians with acting in bad faith. On September 18 Austria sent a 
note to Berlin officially rejecting the League.13 
In addition to opposition from outside Prussia, Radowitz found 
that his program had powerful foes within his own country, especially 
among the Junker class. Their mouthpiece, the .Kreuzzeitung, denounced 
the King's friend as an agent of the revolution and a spy from St. 
Paul's Church. In his diary, Rad.owitz recorded that even his friend, 
Frederick William himself, had begun to entertain serious doubts about 
his ideas as a result of the opposition of the Junkers.14 The fact 
that the major enemies of .the League and its author were reactionary 
Junkers is enough to discredit any attempt to paint Radowitz as an 
agent of reaction. Had he been a reactionary, he would have gained the 
eupport of the Junkers; but as a major spokesman for those who realized 
that the old order had outlived its usefulness and had to be replaced 
by a new and united Germany, he was the very antithesis of the reaction. 
Junker animosity toward the League was expressed:~;in the Prussian 
l3"Prussia," ~-Times (London), September 13, 17, and 18, 1849, 6. 
l4,,Diary," May 19 and .31, 1849, Nach8elassene Briefe, 100, 108. 
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Diet even prior to the Austrian rejection of the plan. On August 25, 
Radowitz presented his program in a speech before the assembly in 
which he summoned all his talents as an orator. Urging support for his 
program, Radowitz cited the growth of German nationalism during the War 
of Liberation and the need for a united German foreign policy.15 The 
effect of his impassioned speech was such that Bismarck reported 
scornfully that by its conclusion there was hardly a dry eye in the 
house. In spite of this enthusiastic reception, the League still had 
many foes. Typical of the opposition was that of Bismarck, who argued 
that "The Prussian people do not want to see their Prussian Kingdom 
dissolved in the rotten fermentation of south German indiscipline. 
Their loyalty is not based on a paper presidency of the Reich. n16 
By October, the plan was all but dead. The pressure of Austria 
on those states which had originally supported the League and the 
opposition of Bavaria and wUrttemberg caused some member states to re-
consider their position. On October 24, Saxony and Hanover both re-
called their ministers to the Hohenzollern Court. Because this sig-
nified the withdrawal of two of the largest members from the League, 
Radowitz rushed to the Prussian Diet that same day with a new program 
and a reaffirmation of the government's dedication to its success. 
The King's friend admitted that his efforts to achieve a new Germany 
had met with initial failure and that a new approach was necessary. 
He now proposed that Germany consist of two unions, the Confederation 
l5"Rede in der zweiten Kammer der preussischen StRn.de am 25sten 
August 1849," Gesammelte Schriften, II, 388-420. 
16F. Darmstaedter, Bisma.rck and the Creation of the Second Reich 
(London: Methuen and Co., 1948);9b.- - -
of 1815 and within this body a smaller organization. This limited 
confederation would adopt the constitution proposed for the League of 
Three Kings but would not separate itself from the larger German 
alliance. He concluded his statement by claiming that this proposal 
was in agreement with ths terms of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 and 
that every attempt would be made to gain the agreement of Austria.17 
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Radowitz's new program was in reality a recasting of his original 
plan for the revision of the German Confederation, first brought forth 
in 1847. It also represented a serious attempt to avoid antagonizing 
Austria by allowing her to remain in a position of authority in Germany. 
Also calculated to please the Habsburg power was the appeal to the 
Treaty of Vienna. In their opposition to the League, the Austrians had 
maintained that it was in violation of this agreement. In this section 
of his program, the champion of German unification had a precedent upon 
which to base his arguments, since a number of the smaller German 
principalities had combined to form single states on several occasions. 
On November 18, in accordance with the Constitution of the League 
of Three Kings, the Prussian Government announced elections for the 
Parliament of the Union at Erfurt. This action brought protests from 
Hanover and Saxony. The north German power replied that the proposed 
smaller confederation was only a beginning and not a final solution of 
the question. The calling of the Parliament was justified on the 
grounds that the movement for German unification must move forward. 
On November 23, Austria joined the two kingdoms in issuing a formal 
protest. This caused Frederick William IV to call a cabinet meeting 
l7"Prussia," ~Times (London), October 29 and 30, 1849, 6. 
which issued a reply defending the right of the Prussians to take 
action to solve the problem of German unity.18 
58 
Although the new Prussian plan of union represented an attempt at 
compromise with the Austrian demands, the Danubian Monarchy continued 
its protests. On December 12, another official note of objection was 
issued by the Habsburg court. This document consisted of three parts. 
In the first section, it was argued that the decision of Prussia to 
call the Parliament was in violation of the Treaty of Vienna, the same 
treaty that Radowitz cited as evidence of the legality of his program. 
The second section objected in advance to any action taken by the 
Parliament. Finally, Austria challenged the right of Prussia to create 
a union of German states without prior consultation with the Emperor 
and his officials and hinted at the possibility of armed intervention 
should the north German kingdom continue her efforts to unite Germany 
under her leadership. The Prussian reply defended the legality of 
her actions as being in full accord with the provisions of the treaty 
of Vienna. The Berlin note also charged that by her combination with 
non-German territories, the Danubian monarchy had vacated her position 
as the leader of Germany destiny. As evidence of this contention, 
the Prussian statement cited the decision of the Frankfurt National 
Assembly to place the Hohenzollern sovereign rather than his Habsburg 
counterpart at the head of Germany.19 
Before Radowitz could turn his full attention to the Parliament, 
he was required to concern himself with another matter. Since the end 
1811Prussia, 11 The Illustrated London News, November 2.4, 1849, 338; 
"Prussia," The Times (London), November 2.4, and 26, 1849, 3, 6. 
-
l9"Prussia and Austria," !!:!! Times {London), December 2.4, 1849, 6. 
of the Frankfurt National Assembly, the German Confederation, if it 
was still worthy of such a title, had been headed by Archduke John. 
59 
On September JO, the two German powers had signed an agreement to rule 
Germany by a joint commission. 20 Radowitz was named by Frederick 
William IV to represent him on this body, 21 and he left Berlin for 
Frankfurt on December 12 to assume his new position. 22 The meetings 
of the commission accomplished nothing toward solving the differences 
between the two states contending for German leadership, however, and 
on December 20, Archduke John surrendered his office to the Prussian 
and Austrian representatives. Finally, on January 28, 1850, Radowitz 
• 
was recalled to Berlin to make preparations for the opening of the 
Parliament. 23 
Discussions concerning the problems presented by the Austrian 
objections to Radowitz's proposals in Berlin reached a high point in 
February, 1850. On February 14, Radowitz wrote Foreign Minister van 
Schleinitz to request his support. Two days later, the King wrote his 
friend of his doubts concerning the wisdom of pressing the matter. He 
was very concerned about the possibility of war with Austria. Rado-
witz, realizing the importance of maintaining the King's support, 
wrote an immediate reply in which he repeated his arguments of the 
past several months concerning the union. He also wrote Count Branden-
2~einecke, Radowitz, 357. 
2111Prussia, 11 ~ Times (London), November 21, 1849, 6. 
2211Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Berlin, December 11, 1849," 
Nachgelassene Briefe, 144. 
2311Prussia and Austria," and "Germany," The Times (London), 
December 24, 1849, and January 12, 1850, 6. 
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burg to discount the possibility of war on the grounds that the 
guarantees of other European states to Berlin would act as a deterrent 
to any aggressive intent on the part of the Habsburg Court. 24 The 
result of his series of letters was the decision of the King and his 
advisors to instruct Schleinitz to send a note to his Austrian counter-
part defending the Prussian plan of union in ·very clear tenns. 25 
Thus Rad.owitz was able to calm his king and save his program for at 
least the moment. 
Radowitz realized that Austria would never voluntarily vacate 
her position in Gennany. He hoped that his idea of a "wider and 
narrower union" would provide a middle ground between Gennan unifica-
tion without Austria and continued German disunion with the Habsburg 
Empire. He also knew that the constitution produced at Frankfurt 
would never gairi the approval of the Danubian Monarchy and thus sought 
to effect a compromise between Vienna and the advocates of German 
unity. 26 His willingness to give up part of his work at Frankfurt 
in order to save as much as possible reveals the King's friend as a 
realistic and moderate statesman. 
In the meantime, plans were being made for the. opening of the 
Parliament provided for in the Constitution of the League of the 
Three Kings. Prussia and the Mecklenburgs, the remaining states in 
24"Radowitz to Schleinitz, Frankfurt, February 14, 1S50," Fred.er-
. ick William IV to Radowitz, Charlottenburg, February 16, 1S50," 
"Radowitz to Frederick William IV; . Frankfurt, February lS, 1~50," and 
"Radowitz to Count Brandenburg, Frankfurt, February 20, 1S50," 
Nac}igelassene Briefe, 161, 165, 167, and 170. 
25"Prussia," ~Times, (London), March 5, 1S50, 6. 
26
"Private Notes of Radowitz, March 2, 1S50," Nachgelassene 
Briefe, 174. 
the League, held elections as scheduled on January 31, 1850, but the 
democratic parties refused to participate in protest against the in-
direct method of election. On January 12, Radowitz had accepted the 
nomination of Arnsberg for the House of the People. However, on 
February 9, he was informed of his election to that body by the city 
of Erfurt instead. 27 Some members of the Prussian Ministry became 
concerned over the possibility of a serious split developing in the 
Parliament were it to enter into a controversy during the discussion 
on the adoption of the Constitution of the League. In an effort to 
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avoid this eventuality, the Ministry voted on March 9 to lay it 
before the Parliament as a whole rather than article by article. 28 
On March 20, the Parliament held its first session in St. Augus-
tine' s Church at Erfurt. In a somewhat dry, legalistic statement, 
Radowitz formally declared the meeting in official session. He in-
formed the delegates that they had before them two important matters, 
the ratification of the constitution and the drafting of an election 
law for elections to the ijouse of the People. After this, the two 
houses divided for their organizational sessions. The House of the 
States elected Alfred von Auerswald of Prussia President by a vote 
of sixty-three to fifty, and then adopted a set of rules. Radowitz 
himself presided over the opening of the House of the People. The next 
day the popular house busied itself with the report of the Credentials 
27,.Prussia," The Illustrated London News, February 2, 1850, 66; 
"Prussia," Illit Times, (London), January 12, and February 9, 1850, 6. 
28s;ybel, ~ Founding 2f ~ German Erppire, I, 410. 
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Committee.29 
As was the case at Frankfurt, the membership of the Erfurt Parlia-
ment divided into political factions or embryonic parties. The Right 
was led by such men as Ernst Ludwig, Leopold von Gerlach, Friedrich 
Julius Stahl, Otto von Bismarck and Hans von Kleist-Retzow. The 
policy of this group was ultra-royalist in character and favored the 
fonnation of a federation of Gennan states rather than the union 
advocated by Radowitz. Another association called the Catholic-Con-
servative Party was led by Franz Joseph Buss pnd August Reichensperger, 
and took a position similar to that of the Right. Radowitz and his 
supporters, including Count Brandenburg, Otto von Manteuffel, and Ernst 
Bodelschwingh, fonned the State-Conservative Party. 
The Left at Erfurt was known by the collective name of 
Bahnhofspartei, owing to the fact that they dined together at the 
railway station. This group was further divided into the Liberal-
Conservative Party and the National Liberals. The Liberal Conserva-
tives were led by Alfred and Rudolf von Auerswald and Georg Vincke. 
The National Liberals were led by Simson, Camphausen, Dahlmann, Durk-
witz, Brllggemann and Sybel. The chief difference between the two 
factions of the Left lay in the participation of the National Liberals 
in a conference at Gotha in June, 1849, which had endorsed the League 
of Three Kings. The first demonstration of the relative strengths of 
these groups was the election of the National Liberal Edward Simson 
as President of the House of the People with ninety-eight votes against 
2911neutschland," Die deutsche Zeitung, March 22, 1S50, 2-4; 
"Prussia," The Times · (London) , March 26, 1$50, 6. 
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a combined total of fifty-four for his four opponentso30 
On March 26, the father of the Erfurt Parliament addressed the 
assembly in behalf of the Executive Council, of which he was President. 
Pleading his case on the basis of constitutional law, he stated that 
his country was completely within its rights in seeking German uni-
fication on the basis of a closer union of states within the confines 
of the Confederation of 1S15. Radowitz ended this speech, the last he 
would ever make, with a statement in favor of peace between the two 
German powers. After he finished, the Parliament voted to recess for 
31 Easter. 
The reaction to Radowitz's appeal was mixed. The ~ Preussische 
Zeitun.g was overwhelming in its praise. It called him the "Father of 
the League" and stated that he had become the leader of the moderate 
forces in Germany against the extremes of the Left and Right. Rado-
witz was pictured as a friend of justice and honor and his program 
was portrayed as a rational solution to the German problem. Other 
papers such as the National Zeitung took a somewhat different position. 
The editors of this organ of the moderate democrats charged that the 
Prussian league merely added to the already existing confusion in 
Germany and declared that the Erfurt Parliament lacked the support of 
the German peopleo 32 The liberal Deutsche Zeitun.g praised the 
abilities of the father of the Parliament, but wondered if he had not 
3o"Prussia," ~Times (London), March 29, and April 13, 1$50, 6; 
Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit ~ (4 vols., 
Stuttgart: Wo Kohlhammer Verlag, 1957-1960), II, S95-$96. 
3l"Rede in dem Parlamente zu Erfurt am 26sten MH.rz 1$50," Gesam-
mel te Schriften II, 433-449; "Prussia," The Times (London), March 29, 
1$50, 6. 
32"Prussia," The Times (London)'·, March 29, 1$50, 6. 
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burned his ship out from under him by his own moderation.33 Upon 
hearing of the address, Frederick William IV wrote his friend a letter 
of praise and thanked him for his work. 34 
Even as the Parliament was in session, however, events in other 
parts of Germany were working for its destructiono A crisis developed 
when the King of wUrttemberg opened the Diet at Stuttgart with a strong 
denunciation of Prussia and her League. Berlin responded to this by 
recalling its minister to the south German kingdom. The representative 
of Hesse-Kassel to the Executive Council at Erfurt informed his fellow 
ministers that his state considered any actions taken by the Parlia-
ment to be but tentative and refused to commit himself to support 
them. 35 These problems caused the Executive Council to decide to pre-
sent the constitution to the delegates as a whole in an effort to 
avoid a split in the membership of the Parliament at a time when unity 
was of the utmost importance.36 
However, events outside the control of the men at Erfurt caused 
a further shift in Prussian policy.. On February 27, Austria's chief 
minister, Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg, used his influence on 
Bavaria, wll.rttemberg, Saxony, and Hanover to persuade their representa-
tives to fonn a rival League of Four Kingso Although Hanover declined 
to sign the constitution of the new League, it did express official 
3311Erfurt," Deutsche Zeitung, March 29, 1850, 2. 
34"Frederick William IV to Radowitz, Potsdam, March Zl, 1850," 
Nachgelassene Briefe, 189. 
35sybel, ~Founding of~ German Empire, I, 417; "Radowitz to 
Schleinitz, Erfurt, March 27, 1850, 11 Nachgelassene Briefe, 186-187. 
3611Prussia, 11 ~ Times (London), April 1 and 3, 1850, 5, 6. 
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support of the ideas behind the document.37 The success of this 
Austrian rival to the Prussian League raised increasing doubts on 
the part of Frederick William IV as to the future of the Radowitz 
program. On March 26, he warned Radowitz that the decisions reached 
at Erfurt could only take effect through the agreement of the German 
princes on the matter. The father of the Erfurt Parliament reacted 
to the King's letter wH.h anger. On March 30, he attended a meeting 
of the ministry in Berlin. After some discussion it was decided that 
the Parliament should be allowed to revise the constitution and that 
the results of this would be used as a basis for negotiations with 
the other German states.38 
However, when the Erfurt Parliament convened after Easter, the 
National Liberals refused to accept this recommendation and forced the 
body to adopt the complete and unamended constitution on April 14. 
As Leopold von Gerlach observed at the time, the National Liberals had 
taken a position "al la Sto Paul's Church," by their insistence in the 
authority of the Erfurt Parliament to revise the constitution and force 
its adoption by the member stateso On April 21, the Parliament voted 
a recess of two days so that consultations could take place in Berlin 
between Radowitz and his fellow ministers.39 
The course of events had placed Radowitz in a difficult position. 
He had written the constitution adopted by the League and ratified by 
37sybel, ~Founding 2f ~German Empire, I, 408. 
3SGerlach, Denkwllrdigkeiten, VI, 463-4640 
39"The German Parliament," and "Prussia and the Gennan Parliament," 
The Times (London), April lS and 26, 1850, 6; Gerlach, Denkw3.rdig-
keiten, VI, 4630 
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the Erfurt Parliament, but as a member of the King's circle, he was 
forced to disavow it. He was realistic enough to realize that without 
the support of Berlin he could accomplish nothing. The Parliament 
could take any action it wished, but it lacked the power to put that 
action into effect. Radowitz also knew that the conservative mini-
sters had enough influence over the King to cause him to consider 
seriously the abandonment of the whole projecto At the same time that 
his opposition was gaining strength at home, the protests of Schwarzen-
berg were at their strongest. 
After the ratification of the Constitution of the League on 
April 14, the members of the Parliament began its revision. It was 
generally assumed that the Prussian Ministry would support the Parlia-
ment, but Radowitz refused to commit himself on the issue. The 
assumption on the part of the public was reinforced by a declaration 
by the Ministry on April 23 supporting the proceedings of the meeting 
at Erfurt.40 But after gaining a victory in the forced adoption of 
the constitution, the National Liberals split among themselves. This 
allowed the ministry to dominate the remaining meetings of the Parlia-
ment. An example of this was the debate of April 26 on a proposal to 
force the diets of the member states to adopt the same election pro-
cedures as the national body. After Manteuffel expressed his 
opposition to this proposal, a statement in agreement from Radowitz 
was enough to force its rejection. In fact, The Times of London 
reported that on every controversial question a stand by the father 
of the Parliament was enough to sway the membership to support his 
40"Prussia," and "Prussia and the German Parliament," The Times 
(London), April 22 and 26, 1B50, 6. 
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position. Finally, on April 30, Radowitz communicated to the House 
of the People a message qf adjournment from the Executive Council. In 
its message the Council promised to submit the Constitution to the 
governments of the member states and reserved the right to recall the 
body into session at some unspecified date.41 
Both the Frankfurt National Assembly and the Erfurt Parliament 
had met to solve the problem of German unity. Both drew up constitu-
tions and developed party structures, but ended without seeing their 
objectives realized because neither had the power to force the states 
to accept their recommendations. The major difference between the 
two bodies was the presence of a group at Erfurt with official power 
to propose legislation. Another difference was the presentation of a 
previously written draft constitution to the assembly at Erfurt. At 
Frankfurt no one had enjoyed this authority, and the result was a full 
discussion of every aspect of the German question in all its many 
facets, a feature which was absent from the deliberations at Erfurt. 
Still another difference between the two meetings was the domination 
of a representative of one German state over the proceedings at 
Erfurt. While it is true that Heinrich von Gagern played a most im-
portant role in the deliberations at Frankfurt, he did not exercise 
the influence which Radowitz enjoyed at Erfurt. Finally, the more 
moderate factions of German political thought were present at both 
conferences, but the extreme parties at each were different, giving 
each meeting a radically different character. At Frankfurt, the 
Bismarck and Gerlach type of political thought was not really 
41"Prussia," and 1iThe Prorogation of the Erfurt Parliament," 
~ Times (London), April 30 and May 4, 1850, 6. 
represented. At Erfurt, the reactionary Right was present, but the 
radical Left refused to participate. In conclusion, the Erfurt 
Parliament was the creation of the Prussian ruling class, and when 
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the Parliament lost· their support it met with failure. But the Frank-
furt National Assembly had been at least partially the creation of 
the German people. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROAD TO OIMftTZ 
Just when it seemed that his work would end in failure with the 
Erf'urt Parliament, an event occurred that provided Radowitz with an 
opportunity to snatch victory from the situation. On April 13, Duke 
Ernst of' Coburg proposed to the father of' the Parliament that the 
princes of' the member states of' the Prussian Union meet with their 
ministers to discuss a solution to the problem. It was hoped that 
this would provide a middle ground between the position of' the National 
Liberals and their opponents. Radowitz illllEdiately adopted this idea 
and proposed it to his soveriegn.1 At a meeting of' the Ministry, 
Frederick William decided to call a Congress of' Princes inunediately 
to discuss the constitution adopted at Erfurt. 2 
However, once again the King began to have doubts concerning the 
wisdom of' his friend's plan. Radowitz had hoped that the princes 
would be able to cope both with the Austrian opposition to the Union 
and the objections of' the south German states, who had f'onned the 
rival League of' the Four Kings. On April 23, Schleinitz informed him 
that the King had become concerned about the Habsburg objections and 
that he saw no value in the proposed Congress of' Princes. To his 
1
"Ra.dowitz to Frederick William IV, Erfurt, April 13, 1850," 
Nachgelassene Brief'e, 199· 
2 Gerlach, nenkwU.rdigkeiten, VI, 465. 
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objections, Radowitz replied that the princes would be able to revise 
the constitution in such a fashion as to make it acceptable to all 
member states and thus provide a basis for true German unity. Per-
suaded by his friend's earnest conviction, the King finally gave his 
fonnal approval of the scheme. The Congress of Princes was to convene 
in Berlin immediately and consider the reaction of the governments to 
the amendments adopted at Erfurt, the establishment of a government 
for the Union, the response to the Austrian objections, and relations 
between the Union and the other German states. 3 
Before the Congress could meet, however, Radowitz suffered a deep 
personal tragedy when his youngest daughter Veronika died. Overcome 
by grief, he wrote that he felt as if he had buried all his hope with 
her. Two days later, he asked to be relieved of his official duties 
in order to care for his sick wife, but Frederick William responded 
immediately with a letter expressing his personal distress that his 
friend would leave his side at such an important time. It indicates 
a great deal about Radowitz' s dedication to the cause of Gennan unity 
and his loyalty to his sovereign that he yielded to the King's request 
to return to Berlin. To his diary he confided that he considered it 
a matter of honor and obligation that he continue his work.4 
In spite of his decision to host the Congress of Princes in 
3"Radowitz to Schleinitz, April 22, 1850," "Schleinitz to Radowitz, 
Berlin, April 24, 1850," "Radowi tz to Frederick William IV, Erfurt, 
April 26, 1850," Telegraphic Dispatch of the King to Radowitz, Pots-
dam, April Z7, 1850, 10:30 A.M. ," and "Radowitz to Frederick William 
IV~ Erfurt, April 28, 1850, Midnight," Radowitz, Nachgelassene Briefe, 
213, 218-220, 222, 223. 
4"Radowitz' s Notes on the Congress of Princes, Berlin, May 8-16, 
1850," "Radowitz to Frederick William IV, Erfurt, May 6, 1850," and 
"Frederick William IV to Radowitz, Bellevue, May 7, 1850," ibid., 
236, 237' 240. 
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Berlin, Frederick William IV did not cease to entertain serious doubts 
about the wisdom of the path down which his friend had led him. On 
May 5, he expressed a strong fear of the possibility of war with 
Austria, 5 and he was generally indecisive and without belief in the 
undertaking.6 Nevertheless, the Congress opened on May 9. In attend-
ance were the Elector of Hesse, representing the Grand Duke of Hesse-
Darmstadt as well as his own state, the Grand Duke of Baden, the Duke 
of Saxe-Meiningen, the Prince of Lippe-Schaumberg, the Prince of Wal-
deck, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, and the King of Prussia. Frederick 
William IV opened the Congress with a speech of greeting and ~ ex-
pression of hopes for the future of the Union. The Duke of Coburg 
replied in the name of the assembled princes and thanked the Hohen-
zolleni monarch for his work toward the unification of Germany. Next, 
they unanimously adopted a statement to be sent to the Habsburg Court. 
In this dispatch, they charged that Austria had no right to attempt 
the revival of the Confederation of 1815 or to demand the attendance 
of representatives of the German states in Frankfurt by invoking the 
laws of the Confederation. Though the princes agreed to the right of 
the Habsburg Monarchy to request privately that the German states 
voluntarily send representatives to Frankfurt, they denied her the 
right to force the adoption of anything resulting from such a meeting.7 
However, the opening session was no indication as to the atti-
tudes of some of the delegatese In the meetings of the ministers, over 
5"Frederick William IV to Radowitz, Charlottenburg, May 5, 1850," 
ibid.' 235. 
~einecke, Radowitz, 422. 
?"Prussia," The Times (London), May 13, 1850, 6. 
which Radowitz presided, Hans von Hassenpflug of Hesse-Kassel stated 
that he was only present as an observer and that his state refused to 
bind itself to accept the decisions of the Congress. In the meetings 
of the princes, the Elector took the same obstructionist position. A 
stormy session occurred after the Elector kept the other princes 
waiting for almost an hour while· dining with the Austrian Minister to 
Berlin. Finally, he objected that others besides princes had been 
allowed to participate in the proceedings. This elicited a strong 
B 
reply from Count Brandenburg, and the Elector left the Congress. 
After the withdrawal of the Elector and his minister, the Con-
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gress came to a swift end. On the following day, Mecklenburg-Strelitz 
also informed the membership of its decision to cease active partici-
pation in the Union. Since it seemed impossible at that time to reach 
an agreement acceptable to all parties, Prussia proposed that a pro-
visional government in the form of a Council of Princes be formed. 
Thirteen of the member states accepted this proposal, while Baden, 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Nassau, Anhalt-Dessau and the Hansa Cities 
favored individual action through their governments instead. On May 
16, the Congress of Princes adjourned. On Radowitz's suggestion, it 
was agreed that the member states would send representatives to the 
Austrian assembly at Frankfurt. The next day Friedrich Wilhelm IV 
announced his acceptance of the constitution as amended at Erfurt. 
However, he stated that since the German states had not been able to 
reach any form of agreement concerning the document, the provisional 
government proposed by the Congress of Princes would go into effect 
\einecke, Radowitz, 425; Sybel, The Founding of the German 
Empire, I, 426; "Prussia," The Times (London), May 16, 1B50, 6. 
until agreement could be reached. He also announced that the dele-
gates of the member states at Frankfurt would act as a unit. 9 Thus, 
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the League created at Berlin and ratified at Erfurt was set aside until 
it would be possible to put it into effect. 
After the Congress ended, Radowitz requested a leave of absence 
to recover his health and left Berlin for Baden-Baden. On May 22, 
Frederick William IV was shot in the arm by a would-be assassin while 
preparing to board a train for Potsdam.10 These events had a double 
effect on the course of German history. For one thing, the attempted 
assassination strengthened the reactionary forces in Prussia. These 
persons were also staunch foes of Radowitz and his ideas and would 
in the end prove as important in his final defeat as the Habsburg 
Monarchy. Another consequence of the inability of both Radowitz and 
the King to act at this crucial juncture was the granting of time to 
Austria. Had they been able to act in a decisive manner to force a 
solution to the German problem at a time when Austria was still in-
volved in internal problems, perhaps Radowitz's program might not have 
ended in failure. 
Before he was incapacitated by the attacker's bullet, the King 
had made one important attempt to gain foreign support for the 
Prussian Union. The Prince of Prussia, the future Emperor William I, 
was sent to Warsaw to deliver a letter from the King to Tsar Nicholas 
I. In this communication, the Hohenzollern justified his actions by 
9"Prussia," The Times (London), May 17, 20, and 21, 1850, 6; 
Meinecke, RadowitZ,426; Sybel, ~ Foundipg of the German Empire, I, 
4'Z/. 
lO"Prussia," The Times, (London), June 3. and Z1, 1850, 6. 
-
74 
claiming that the smaller German states desired to be under the pro-
tection of his kingdom. He condemned Austria for its attempt to revive 
the Confederation of 1815. In his discussions with William, the Tsar 
discounted the possibility of an Austro-Prussian War because of Austrian 
we~ess. The Austrian chief minister, Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg 
was also in the Polish capital and met with the Prussian emissary. He 
informed William that his country had no objections to Prussia forming 
a union with other German states but could never accept the application 
of the constitution produced by Radowitz. He reiterated the peaceful 
intentions of Vienna and proposed that the differences between the two 
states be resolved by a joint agreement. On May 29, William reported 
to Berlin that neither Russia nor Austria would definitely commit 
themselves on the issue. He also claimed that the chances of Austria 
carrying her objections to the Prussian Union to the point of armed 
conflict were remote at that time. Finally, he informed his King that 
both countries would agree to a Prussian union if Berlin would abandon 
th t •t t• 11 e cons i u ion. 
Although in Baden~aden, Radowitz did not cease to take an 
interest in the future of his work. His representative in Berlin, 
Baron Rudolf von Sydow, informed him that the Prince's report had 
intensified the King's doubts regarding the wisdom of continuing the 
Union. On the other hand, Count Brandenburg, a man with a great deal 
of influence at Court, supported the Union and believed that Prussia 
should take advantage of Austria's weakness to force a solution to the 
German problem. Radowitz replied by asking Sydow to advise the King 
11sybel, ~Founding of the German Empire, I, 446. 
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that even if it was necessary to postpone the application of the 
constitution, the power of the provisional government should continue 
in effect. On June 14, he wrote the King to plead his cause. He re-
peated his arguments of the past two years in behalf of the unifica-
tion of Germany and urged his friend to continue his support of the 
constitution. He proposed once again that Germany be divided into a 
wider union to include Austria and a narrow union which would form a 
'ddl Eu • 12 IIll. e ropean empire. 
In the meantime negotiations continued between the two contesting 
German powers. Schwarzenberg informed the Prussian Minister to the 
Habsburg Court, Count Bernstorff, that his country was willing to 
recognize Prussian equality in Germany if she would be willing to 
abandon her plan of union and agree to form a new German confederation 
at a series of meetings at Frankfurt.13 On July 8, he made his last 
offer. He explained to the Prussian Minister that the only difference 
between the two German powers was the constitution approved at Erfurt 
and the claim of the Prussian Union to represent the German Reich. 
He also stated that his country was willing to recognize the right 
of Berlin to form a union with any other German state it wished so long 
as the constitution was dropped.14 
While Radowitz remained away from the Prussian capital, events 
l2,,Rudolf von Sydow to Radowitz, Berlin, June 5, 1850," "Radowitz 
to Rudolf von Sydow, Baden, June 8, 1850, 11 and "Radowitz to Frederick 
William IV, Erfurt, June 14, 1850," Nachgelassene Briefe, 250, 252, 
258-261. 
1311sydow to Radowitz, Berlin, June 20, 1850," ibid., 262. 
14sybel, ~ Founding of ~ German Empire, I, 458. 
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were progressing. Manteuffel, who had accompanied Prince William to 
Warsaw, was sent bearing a personal letter from the Prussian King to 
Emperor Franz Josef on June 14. This letter, a pledge of Prussian 
friendship, was designed to conciliate the Austrians. From his con-
versations in· Vienna, the Prussian emissary reported that Russian and 
Austrian objections to Radowitz and his plan were so great that they 
would refuse to negotiate seriously as long as the father of the Union 
was allowed to keep his position. But the King, refusing to harken to 
this advice, informed Radowitz of the failure of the negotiations and 
asked for his prompt return to Berlin.15 
Early in July Radowitz returned to the Prussian capital to assume 
his duties as President of the Council of Princes. At the Council's 
first meeting on July 5, Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Kassel officially 
withdrew from the Union.16 On July 10, this body began discussions 
on Bemstorff' s report from Vienna. It was decided to inform Schwarz-
enbe rg that his demands were unacceptable. They also resolved that 
further negotiations should be postponed. Though the Prussian King 
continued his doubts about the continuance of the Union, his friend 
was able to persuade him to continue the fight for German unifica~ion. 
On July 17, the Prussian reply to the Austrian demands was delivered 
to Schwarzenberg. The Austrian minister replied that his country 
l5"Frederick William IV to Franz Josef, Sansouci, June 14, 1850," 
"Otto von Manteuffel to Radowitz, Vienna, June 20," and "Frederick 
William IV-to Radowitz, Sansouci, June 22, 1850," Nachgelassene Briefe, 
255, 263, 265. 
1611Radowitz to his wife, Sansouci, June 4 and 5, 1850," ibid., 'Zf2. 
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would never recognize the Prussian union and its constitution, nor 
would it agree to abandon its plans to convene the Diet of the Ge:nnan 
Confederation. That same day the Danubian Monarchy issued a circular 
to the Ge:nnan courts calling for a meeting of the Diet at Frankfurt. 
Naturally, Berlin rejected this invitation.17 
The failure of the negotiations with Austria caused a major 
crisis in the Prussian Ministry. On July 24, Manteuffel, the Minister 
of the Interior, presented a motion calling for the abandonment of 
the Union and the constitution. As compensation to the member states, 
he proposed that they be offered a protective alliance by the north 
German power.18 The acceptance of this proposal would mean that all 
the work of Radowitz had been in vain and that he had been defeated 
not by Austria but by his foes within his own country. The champion 
of German unification replied to this challenge with a long memorandum. 
In this document, he stated that it would represent a major moral 
defeat if the Hohenzollern Kingdom were to yield to the Habsburg de-
mands. He claimed that in forming the union, Berlin had incurred an 
obligation both to the member states and the whole Ge:nnan people to 
fight for its preservation. He concluded with a plea that Prussia 
not allow the Austrians to destroy the edifice which had been built 
to replace the ineffective Confederation of 1815.19 
On May 26, the issue was decided. Frederick William IV met with 
l7"Prussia," The Times (London), July 15 and 20, 1850, 6; Sybel, 
Ih!t Founding 2f the German Empire, I, 460-461. 
18Ibid., 462-463. 
l9"Aufzeichnung zum Ministerrat am 25. Juli, Sansouci, 13 Juli, 
1850," N ach8elassene Brief e , 273-27 5. 
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the Ministry and informed them that while the differences among them 
would delay the application of the constitution, the principle upon 
which it stood must not be allowed to fall. Naturally, the King's 
pronouncement caused some debate. Finally, it was decided to wait 
for further action from the Habsburg Empire before taking any drastic 
steps. 20 With the publication of Austrian demands and their rejections 
by Prussia, Germany was divided into two hostile camps. Neither side 
would agree to back down, thus opening the way for some sort of con-
fiict which would make it possible for one side to prevail over the 
other. 
During the summer of 1850, the conflict between th.e two German 
powers intensified, fed as it was by a series of increasingly bitter 
confrontations both within Germany and without. A serious crisis 
almost developed over the question of troop deployment. On May 26, 
the Grand Duke of Baden had requested that some of his troops be 
trained by Prussia. At the end of July, Austria ordered its com-
mander at the Federal Fortress at Mainz to resist any attempt to 
transport troops from Baden to Prussia through his district. 21 The 
Austrian protests were accompanied by the massing of 16, 700 Bavarian 
troops at Aschafi'enburg and Nuremberg. In a ;Letter to the King and 
before a session of the Ministry, Radowitz suggested that Berlin 
answer this move by the mobilization of the three army corps at 
22 Erfurt. This proposal drew a quick response from his enemies 
20sybel, The Founding of 2 German Empire, I, 464-465. 
~einecke, Radowitz, 442. 
2211Radowitz to Frederick William IV, August 4, 1850," 
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within the Ministry. General Sockenhausen informed them that he could 
spare no troops at that time. He also advised against the mobilization 
of the militia, as the men were needed for the upcoming harvest. The 
fighter for German unification continued to urge a strong reply to the 
Austrian challenge, until finally the King intervened. Frederick 
William IV suggested that a message be sent to Schwarzenberg proposing 
that both sides postpone further action on the matter pending an 
. t• t• 23 inves iga ion. 
During the remainder of the summer, European affairs were 
dominated by the Schleswig-Holstein question. Since there existed 
at this time no common German authority to negotiate with Denmark, it 
was impossible to reach an agreement binding all of Germany. Prussia, 
acting on its own behalf, signed a treaty on July 2 giving the Duchies 
to the Danish King. Several small German states immediately objected 
that the Hohenzollern Kingdom had no authority to take this step and 
that a peace with the Danes could only be negotiated through the 
auspices of the Diet of the Confederation. This turn of events 
greatly upset Tsar Nicholas I, who desired the immediate cession of 
all hostilities over the Duchies and the destruction of all liberal 
elements in them. In an effort to persuade Austria to take action 
similar to that of Prussia, he sent Baron Mayendorff to Bad Ischl to 
communicate with the Emperor. Even before his arrival however, the 
Habsburg Court signed an agreement with the Nordic Kingdom similar to 
that signed by Prussia. This removed one source of difficulty between 
Austria and Russia and opened the way for Russian intervention in the 
23sybel, ~ Founding of ~German Empire, I, 466. 
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German question on the side of Vienna. 24 
The already complex international situation was further complica-
ted by the actions of Prince Louis Napoleon, the President of France. 
He saw in the dispute between the two German powers an opportunity to 
strengthen his country. Accordingly, he sent Jean de Persigny to speak 
with Radowitz. The French diplomat indicated that his country was 
in sympathy with the Prussian cause, since France was interested in 
driving the Habsburgs out of Italy. He further hinted that France 
could consider going to war on the side of Berlin with the provision 
that should French public opinion warrant it, his country receive 
either Landau or Savoy as a compensation for the costs of war. Rado-
witz politely listened to the Frenchman and just as politely refused 
to consider his offer. Napoleon next made a similar proposal to 
Austria, which was also rejected. 25 
The incipient conflict between Austria and Prussia continued to 
smolder during the month of August. The Danubian Monarchy persisted 
in its attempts to call a meeting of the Federal Diet, while Prussia 
26 
replied to the Austrian efforts with a note of protest on August 5. 
In Berlin, the King's friend continued to fight for his proposals • 
• In this he was able to gain two very important allies, Count Branden-
berg and the Prince of· Prussia. 
In the autumn of 1S50, the contending interests culminated in a 
24Paul Wiegler, William the First, His Life and Times, (trans. by 
Constance Vasey, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.:-1929) 146; Sybel, 
The Founding of~ German Empire, I, 472. 
25sybel, The Founding 2f the German Empire, I, 452. 
2611Prussia and Austria," ~ Times (London), August 21, 1S50, 6. 
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final crisis between Austria and Prussia which sealed the fate of 
Radowitz's efforts toward German unification. It is ironic that the 
vehicle for his final defeat was Hesse-Kassel, the state that twenty-
seven years earlier had expelled him. The Elector Frederick William 
had been trying for several months to force the diet of his small 
state to vote taxes to pay for the expenses of his government. When 
the members of this body refused to yield, his chief minister, 
Hassenpflug, attempted to collect taxes illegally. In this effort 
he was opposed by the entire civil service~ On September 12, the 
Elector fled to Frankfurt. With his sovereign safe, Hassenpflug next 
tried to use the army to collect the taxes. This resulted in the 
resignation of nine-tenths of the officer corps, who refused to violate 
their oaths to the constitution. On September 28, the Elector appealed 
to the Diet in Frankfurt for help in suppressing the revolt. Dominated 
by Austria, the Diet voted to order 10,000 Hanoverian and wtll'tt-em-
bergian troops to march into the small Gennan state. Z'/ 
These events placed the men in Berlin in a difficult position. 
Some officials, such as Count Brandenburg, believed that the real 
reason for the south German intervention in Hesse was a desire to em-
barrass Prussia. 28 Radowitz urged immediate military precautions. He 
suggested that reinforcements be sent to Wetzlar from Kreuznacher and 
that a detachment of 15,000 Thurnigian troops be dispatched to Fulda 
and Eisenach in order to be in position to march on Hersfeld. He 
further urged that 10,000 Prussian troops be joined by 2,000 men from 
Z'/ Sybel, The Founding £!. ~ German Empire, I, 481; "Electorial 
Hesse," The London Illustrated News, September 28, 1850, 254. 
28wiegler, William the First, 147. 
Brunswick at Paderborn. Frederick William IV approved of these 
actions, and the same day named Radowitz Minister of Foreign Affairs. 29 
The north German kingdom also protested the intervention through 
a series of diplomatic notes. On September 12 and 21, Count Branden-
burg sent notes through Baron Thiele, the Prussian Minister at Kassel, 
to the Electorial court. These notes stated that the Hohenzollern 
Kingdom was distressed by the decision of the Elector to depart from 
the path of constitutional government and called upon him to return 
to lawful methods. The dispatch also protested strongly the decision 
of the Diet to intervene in the crisis. On the first day in his new 
position, Radowitz reinforced Brandenburg's notes with one of his 
own.30 Schwarzenberg had a~gued that Prussia had no right to interfere 
in the actions of the south German states, since Electoral Hesse had 
withdrawn from the voluntary union. The Prussian· Foreign Minister 
replied to this with a statement that his country had no interest in 
territorial expansion at the expense of the smaller German state but 
was only concerned with the protection of the Prussian military roads 
running through ito He later communicated to his Austrian counterpart 
the peaceful intentions of the Hohenzollern kingdom. 3l 
The Prussian assurances did little to check the intensification 
of feelings on both sides, however. On October 11, Austria, Bavaria 
and wll.rttemberg fonneda defensive and offensive alliance against 
2911Ra.dowitz to the Prince of Prussia, September 26, 1850," and 
"Privataufzeichnung von Radowitz, Z7 September, 1850, 11 Nachgelassene 
Brief e, 3180 
3011Prussia and Electorial Hesse , 11 The Times. (London), October 3, 
1850, 6. -
3lSybel, The Founding 2! ~German Empire, 487-488. 
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Prussia and also agreed to raise an army of 200,000 men. On that 
same day Prussia mobilized three additional regiments. As the crisis 
intensified, the backing given by Frederick William IV to his friend 
never wavered. However, the King did make efforts to avoid carrying 
things to the extremity of armed conflict. One such endeavor was a 
letter sent on October 19 to Franz Josef expressing his desire to 
reach a peaceful settlement of the differences between them. 32 
At this point it became known in the Prussian capital that Tsar 
Nicholas IV had decided to visit Warsaw. Immediately, Count Brandenburg 
was sent to the Polish capital to deliver anote to the Russian monarch. 
This communication stated that the Hohenzollern kingdom refused to 
grant recognition to the Diet in Frankfurt. Brandenburg was also 
instructed to propose to the Tsar that the crisis be settled by a 
conference of all the German states, during which Prussia would be 
granted equality with Austria. 33 Nicholas replied that he had no 
intention of becoming involved in the dispute but that he did favor 
the efforts of the Frankfurt Diet to suppress liberal elements in 
Holstein and would even be willing to go to war in its support. 
On October 25, Emperor Franz Josef also arrived in Warsaw. 
Brandenburg took this opportunity to hold a series of meeting with 
Schwarzenberg, who had accompanied his sovereign. The Austrian 
official rejected at the outset the Prussian demand of equality with 
.32wiegler, William The First, 14B; "Prussia," The Times (London), 
October 11, 1850, 6; "Frederick William IV to Radowitz, Sansouci, 
October 14, 1850," and "Frederick William IV to Franz Josef, Sansouci, 
October 19, 1850," Nachgelassene Briefe, .325, .326. 
3~einecke, Radowitz, 474. 
the Habsburg Empire. He also restated his country's position that 
Prussia had no right to become involved in the matter of H~sse-Kassel. 
Brandenburg replied that Austria and her allies were the ones becoming 
involved in affairs that did not concern them. He informed the Aus-
trian minister that any problems in the Electorate could be handled 
quite satisfactorily by local troops and that Vienna was really only 
seeking a way to exert her power.34 
In Berlin events were developing at a rapid pace. On October 29, 
a meeting of the Ministry adopted Radowitz' s suggestion that in the 
event of a Bavarian invasion of Hesse-Kassel, the Ninth Army Corps be 
mobilized. Two days later, Count Brandenburg returned to the Prussian 
capital. The next day Bernstorff telegraphed the message that Austria 
had ordered the mobilization of 100,000 men on the Bohemian border. 
On November 1, the Ministry met to decide on a course of action in 
response to the new Austrian threats. Brandenburg's report opened the 
session. He recommended that every effort should be made to continue 
negotiations with the Habsburg Monarchy. Next, Radowitz arose to 
demand that the Hohenzollern kingdom order the immediate activation 
of all troops and if necessary prepare for war. He based his plea 
on Schwarzenberg's hostile attitude and his belief that if the 
Danubian Monarchy and her allies were allowed to intervene in Hesse-
Kassel without active opposition, the power of the Frankfurt Diet would 
be established over Germany. His arguments were supported by Adalbert 
· von Ladenberg and August von der Heydt. He was opposed by Manteuffel, 
who went so far as to urge that Berlin lend its support to the Austrian 
34Sybel, ~ Founding of the German Empire, II, 9-12. 
actiono The meeting closed with the declaration from Brandenburg that 
if the Ministry decided to go against his advice, he would resign his 
position. 35 
Almost immediately after the end of the meeting, information was 
received that under the command of the Prince of Thurn and Taxis 
S,000 Bavarian troops had occupied Hanau in Hesse and were marching 
toward Geinhausen. To counter the Bavarian action, Prussian troops 
" under the command of General Groben promptly entered Electoral 
territory. 36 Now it was no longer merely an issue of discussions and 
polite diplomatic notes. Radowitz and his fellow Prussians were at a 
crossroads. They could either continue to support the Union and risk 
almost certain war with Austria and her allies, or they could back 
down and lose everything that had been accomplished in order to avoid 
an armed conflict. As long as there existed a possibility that the 
Habsburgs were only bluffing, it was possible to postpone the decision 
on just how far Berlin was willing to go to see the Union take effect. 
But by November 1, 1S50, troops were marching, and a decision had to 
be made. 
The Bavarian action prompted the immediate calling of a Crown 
Council for that afternoon. At this meeting, Count Brandenburg took 
the position that Prussia should back down. As justification for this 
advice he cited the friendly attitude of Schwarzenberg at Warsaw and 
his belief that in the event of a war between Austria and Prussia, 
3~einecke, Radowitz, 4S3; "Privataufzeichnung von Radowitz," 
Nach~lassene Briefe, 344; Sybel, ~ Founding 2.f. ~German Empire 
II, -27 o 
3611Prussia and Germany," and "The Entry of the Prussians into 
Hesse," The Times (London), November 6, 1S50, 5. 
Russia would intervene on the side of Austria. Frederick William 
IV suggested that the constitution be set aside for the moment and 
that the Bavarians be allowed to occupy the southern part of Hesse-
Kassel, while his troops would garrison the military roads in the 
north. He hoped that this would place his kingdom in a position to 
play a major role in the solution of the conflict. After the king 
had spoken, Radowitz took the floor. In a last effort to save his 
program, he stated that the Hohenzollern troops should occupy as much 
of the Electorate as possible, thus giving Berlin a strong position 
from which to begin negotiations. In answer to those who had ex-
pressed a fear of war, he maintained that there was an important dis-
86 
tinction between mobilization and a declaration of war. Prince William 
supported Radowitz and urged that the Union not be sacrificed. How-
ever, Manteuffel opposed the King's friend with the argument that war 
was a certainty unless the Union were abandoned and the troops recalled. 
He took the position that his country had no right to become involved 
in what he saw as the internal affairs of another German state. 
Finally, August von Stockhausen, the Minister of War, maintained that 
a general mobilization as demanded by Radowitz would almost definitely 
lead to war. With the issue still undecided, the session closed. 37 
The next day Radowitz lost the support of Frederick William IV. 
The King had long entertained doubts about continuing down the path 
which his friend had led him. Now with troops in the field, it was no 
longer a matter of lending moral support to the champion of German 
unity as he had done earlier in 1847. He had either to give up the 
37Meinecke, Radowitz, 487-490. 
whole idea or be willing to lead his people into what could be a 
major war. The King was no Frederick the Great, and he hesitated to 
make a decision. 
The Ministry met at Bellevue Palance at 10:00 A.M. on November 2. 
After a few opening remarks on the dangers facing his kingdom, Freder-
ick William IV led his ministers into an adjoining room and left them 
to discuss the problem. Brandenburg continued to suggest the pulling 
back of the troops and an immediate attempt to continue the negotia-
tions begun at Warsaw. Faithful to his cause until the last, Radowitz 
refused to budge from his position of the day before. When the vote 
finally was held, his position was supported only by those same 
persons who had supported it the previous day; it was thus defeated. 
The Ministry suggested to their monarch that all forward movement 
by Prussian troops in Hesse-Kassel be suspended and that a note be 
sent to Austria requesting its suspension of all preparations for war~ 
Faced with the decision of his ministers, Frederick William IV yielded 
to the advice of the majority with a statement in support of his 
friend and a warning that the Ministry alone would be responsible for 
any criticism that would arise from their judgment.JS 
Thus at the moment of decision, Radowitz was abandoned by his 
fellow ministers. Immediately after the meeting, the man who had 
fought so long for his cause sent his king a letter of resignation.39 
He left the scene of his defeat on November 6 to join his family at 
JB"Privataufzeichnung von Radowitz," Nachgelassene Briefe, 344-345; 
Sybel, ~Founding of the German Empire, II, 36. 
39"Radowitz to Frederick William IV, November 2, 1B50," 
Nachgelassene Briefe, 3450 
the scene of his greatest moments, Erfurt. The King wrote a letter 
expressing his regrets at the outcome of events and thanking him for 
his faithful service.40 On the same day that Radowitz left Berlin, 
Brandenburg died, and Mantteufer was named to the office of Chief 
Minister. 41 
Yet one last effort was made to save the Union. Frederick 
88 
William momentarily regained his courage and decided to attempt a bold 
stroke. On November 9, he informed Radowitz that he was sending him 
to England on the pretext of studying new British developments in 
artillery and the building of bridges from iron. Seeing in the pro-
posal the chance to regain Prussian honor and perhaps even save his 
Union, Radowitz inunediately agreed. Before approaching the British 
Government, Radowitz was instructed to find out its attitude toward 
Gennan affairs through discussions with the Prussian Minister to the 
Court of St. James, Baron Christian von Bunsen. The King's friend 
suggested to his monarch that one possible avenue of approach would 
be to suggest that if Austria won the struggle over Hesse-Kassel, 
Russian hegemony over Gennany would become a possibility. He also 
suggested that he should hint to the British that an Autrian victory 
would open the way for French interference in Gennan affairs. 42 Thus, 
one last effort was to be made to save all the work of the last 
4~einecke, Radowitz, 499-501. 
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sever:a.1. years. 
In the meantime, the Hessian crisis remained unresolved. General 
Gr8ben, finding himself face to face with the Prince of Thurn and 
Taxis and his men, suggested to his counterpart on the other side that 
a line of demarcation be drawn between Prussian-occupied territory and 
that to be held by the southern troops. The Prince communicated this 
proposal to the Austrian Minister to the Diet in Frankfurt, Count Thun. 
After some discussion, the Diet voted to order the Prince to continue 
the occupation of the Electorate, and to demand the immediate with-
drawal of all Prussian troops. The news of these demands caused 
Frederick William IV to order his anny to prepare for war. 43 At a 
meeting of the Ministry on November 20, he announced his decision to 
take up once again the proposals for Gennan unification. It was also 
decided to avoid any attempts at alliance with the French, who had 
been massing troops on the border. 
The next day the King delivered his address from the throne at 
the opening of the Prussian Diet. This speech was couched in such 
strong terms as to cause some to interpret it as a challenge for war. 
Prokesch, the Austrian Minister to the Hohenzollern court, responded 
with a note pledging the protection of the Prussian military roads 
running through the Electorate. The same day, Baron Bud.berg, the 
Russian Ambassador, delivered a note from his monarch. This dispatch 
informed Berlin that the Tsar had ordered the mobilization of the 
Cossaks for war in support of Austria if events should prove such a 
step necessary. On November 23, the Prussian Ministry met to discuss 
43"The Intervention in Hesse , 11 The Times {London), November 11, 
1S50, 3. 
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the issue. As usual, Manteuffel, who had become the head of the 
Ministry upon the death of Brandenburg, urged reconciliation with the 
Danubian Monarchy. In this contention, he received the support of 
Stockhausen and Simon. Ladenberg, whose resignation in support of 
Radowitz had been rejected, stated that since Prussia had already lost 
face over the Erfurt Constitution and the Plan of Union, it should not 
suffer further humiliation on the matter of the military roads. Be-
cause the Ministry was unable to reach an agreement it was decided 
to continue discussion with the King.44 
While discussions continued in Berlin, the Habsburgs decided to 
force the matter to a conclusion. On November Z"/, Prince Thurn and 
Taxis was ordered to march to Kassel and if necessary to fight 
the Prussian troops. Two days before the march, Prokesch delivered a 
demand that Prussia evacuate the Electorate by noon on the day of the 
Austrian movement. Manteuffel immediately transmitted this information 
to the King at Potsdam. Frederick William IV in~tructed his minister 
to telegraph to Vienna that he was being sent to meet with Schwarzen-
berg with a "friendly message." At a meeting of the ministry that day, 
the King ordered Manteuffel to communicate to the Austrian Minister 
that Prussia would consider no further concessions. He also proposed 
that the solution to the Hessian affair be reached at a general Euro-
pean congress. Manteuffel was to attempt to persuade Schwarzenberg to 
agree to the withdrawal of all non-Hessian troops from the Electorate 
and gain Austrian acceptance of the points brought up in his meeting 
44$ybel, ~Founding of~ German Empire, II, 59-60. 
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with the Tsar in Warsaw.45 
Before these proposals could go into effect, a telegram was re-
ceived from Vienna stating that Schwarzenberg would agree to meet with 
Manteuffel as soon as he received confirmation of the Prussian deci-
sion to withdraw from Hesse-Kassel. At this same time, Gr8ben reported 
that the southern troops were advancing on his position. These new 
events prompted the calling of another meeting of the Ministry. Here 
the decision was reached that Manteuffel would go to the proposed 
meeting bearing personal letters from Frederick William to Emperor 
Franz Josef and from the Queen to Archduchess Sophie, her sister and 
the mother of the Emperor. It was hoped that Schwarzenberg would not 
refuse to meet with a person carrying private correspondence to the 
Imperial family. That evening, Bernstorff was told to inform the 
Austrian M:Lnistry that the Prussian representative was on his way to 
Olmlltz. An hour later confinnation was received in Berlin that the 
choice of the Bohemian city was acceptable and the meeting would take 
place.46 
On November 29, Manteuffel and Schwarzenberg held their fateful 
confrontation. The two men reached an agreement that the Hesse-Kassel 
crisis would be solved peacefully by joint Austria-Prussian action. 
The Prussian minister agreed that his government would allow free 
passage for the southern troops through the area occupied by Gr8ben. 
As an assurance of Austrian good intentions, the north Gennan power 
would be allowed to station one battalion in the Electorate. The 
46Ib"d 1 ., 64-67. 
German question would be solved at a conference to be held at Dresden 
in December. 47 Thus a war between the two German powers was averted. 
92 
Some historians have labeled the agreement at OlmUtz a "punctation" 
or "humiliation", 48 but such designation is not justified. It is true 
that Prussia formally abandoned the Union and its constitution, but 
that decision had already been reached on November 2. After that 
date, the Hohenzollern Kingdom was interested in protecting its roads 
and maintaining its honor.. At Olmlltz both conditions were met. 
Austria recognized the right of Prussia to remain in the Electorate 
and to garrison the roads. In so doing, the Habsburg Empire had pro-
vided an avenue of honorable withdrawal for the north Gennan power. 
The so-called "humiliation" of Olmlltz was in reality a compromise 
between two opposing sides. If a "humiliation" had occured it was in 
Berlin on November 2, not at Olmlltz. 
In the meantime, Radowitz had arrived in London five days before 
the meeting at Olmlltz.49 He traveled to Windsor, where he met with 
Prince Albert, Consort to Queen Victoria. Albert informed the Prussian 
emissary that in order to discuss an alliance between the two countries 
he would have to meet with the ministry, and expressed considerable 
doubt that it would accept the proposal. Before leaving the castle, 
Radowitz also had an audience with the Queen. On December 1, Albert 
4711Gennan States," The Illustrated London News, December 14, 
1850, 446. - -
48William Carr, A History..2.f Gennany 1815-1945 (New ¥"ork: St. 
Martin's Press, 1969J, 73; Gordon A. Craig, The Politics 2f. the 
Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 196$), 132. 
49Meinecke, Radowitz, 505. 
wrote the Prussian King to tell him that on such an important matter 
as an alliance between the two countries both Houses of Parliament 
would have to give their approval and for him to interfere in the 
actions of the ministry would be in violation of his constitutional 
position. He also stated that in dealing with political matters in 
England, the feelings of the British public had to be taken into 
consideration. To soften this disappointing reply, Radowitz assured 
the King that Lord John Palmerston, the Prime Minister, favored 
Prussian interests, and in the event of a war between Prussia and 
Austria, would tend to side with Berlin.50 
Just when it seemed that things might be going well in London, 
news of the agreement of OlmUtz arrived, thus ending the value of an 
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alliance between London and Berlin. The father of the ill-fated Union 
wrote his wife that it would be better for King and Country if he were 
to remain in voluntary exile in England until . things cooled ·off, 51 but 
on January 28, he returned to his family at Erfurt. 
After the failure of the Prussian Union and the resurrection of 
the German Confederation the following year, Radowitz swiftly faded 
from the scene. He spent the rest of 1851 and the first part of 1852 
recovering his broken health and preparing his writings for publica-
tion in a five-volume collection. He remained interested in German 
politics, but confined his efforts to drafting occasional letters to 
50"Radowitz to Frederick William IV, London, November 28, 1850," 
"Prince Albert to Frederick William IV; Windsor Castle, December 1, 
1850," and "Radowitz to Frederick William IV, December 3, 1850," 
Nachgelassene Briefe, 367-369, 371. 
5l"Radowitz to his wife, London, December 6, 1850," ibid., 372-373· 
94 
Frederick William IV. After the completion of his collected writings, 
he was appointed to the position of' General Inspector f'or Military 
Preparedness. He occupied himself' with this post and the travels 
associated with it until his health finally broke in the summer of 
1853. He remained active until the very last moments of' his life. 
The day before his death, Radowitz spoke with his wife about his 
plans to write a book concerning the poetry of' marriage, which he in-
tended to dedicate to her. He was unable to begin this work, however, 
f'or he died on Christmas Day, 1853. 52 
52Meinecke, Radowitz, 524-547. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The reasons for Radowitz's defeat are complex. However, the 
single most important factor in his failure was the strong opposition 
he faced within his own country. Such men as Manteuffel, Gerlach, 
Bismarck, and in the end, even Brandenberg refused to support his 
plans. One reason for this was the suspicion with which he was viewed 
by the Junkers. In spite of his friendship with the King and his 
marriage to the Countess Voss, Radowitz was still considered a foreign-
er. He could not trace his ancestry back to Prussian origins; in 
fact his forebears were not even German. Another factor that made 
him seem alien to the Junkers was his religion. Prussia and its 
ruling classes had strong Protestant traditions. Radowitz, as a 
devout Roman Catholic, was looked upon with mistrust. Some even 
wondered if he were not in reality an agent of the Pope. 
The anti-Radowitz feeling prominent among the Junkers had much 
deeper roots than merely his foreign origin and religion. They had 
lived on their estates for centuries and had a fear of anything that 
might threaten their position. They considered anything non-Prussian 
as inferior and even as a source of possible corruption. The uni-
fication of the Hohenzollern kingdom with other German states could 
open the way for a breakdown of the sense of discipline held so dear 
by the Junkers. Radowitz, as the champion of German unification, was 
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advancing ideas considered dangerous by Prussian reactionaries. 
Because of their reactionary attitude, the Junkers were violently 
opposed to the revolution and anything that had any association with 
it. Radowitz had freely participated in the symbol of the revolution, 
the Frankfurt National Assembly, and as such he was considered a "fel-
low traveler'' of the revolution. He also supported the idea of a 
constitutional government for Prussia and the other states. This in~ 
creased his taint of revolution and caused him to be considered a 
dangerous subversive in the eyes of the conservatives. 
The opposition of the Junker class to Radowitz and his ideas was 
complicated by the weakness of Frederick William IV. The King had 
encouraged his friend to form the Union, but when effective leader-
ship was called for, the King was unwilling to take the necessary 
action. He was willing to go along with the wishes of the Ministry 
out of his own inability to reach a decision, not out of agreerrent 
with their position. When he regained his courage, events had pro-
gressed at such a pace that it was impossible to make up for lost time. 
Another important reason for the failure of the Prussian Union 
and its designer was the attitude of Russia. Tsar Nicholas I was 
dedicated to the suppression of the revolution. Once again, the 
association of Radowitz with the Frankfurt National Assembly and 
constitutional fonns of government made him suspect. In addition to 
these factors, the posture assumed by the father of the Union toward 
the crisis over Hesse-Kassel intensified the Tsar's doubts concerning 
the Prussian leader. Schwarzenberg had posed as the champion of 
restoration of the old order. The major difficulty which that restora-
tion faced was the Prussian Union and the protests by the Hohenzollern 
Kingdom against the unconstitutional actions of the Elector and his 
minister. This caused the Tsar to side with Austria. 
On the other hand, Radowitz was no more popular with the demo-
cratic and liberal factions. Oddly enough, they viewed the father 
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of the Erfurt Parliament as the exact opposite of the dangerous 
subversive feared by the Junkers. Thus he was unable to appeal to the 
people for support when the Ministry turned against him. Even if this 
had been possible, his political ideas would have kept him from taking 
such a step. Rad.owitz was no democrat; in reality he was a political 
moderate who avoided association with either extreme. 
Radowitz' s personality played a major role in his career. He was 
something of a romantic but at the same time was coldly practical. In 
fact, he was almost too practical. His letters are full of deeply 
analytical interpretations of the course of events. He spent so much 
time studying the situation that he was incapable of the quick action 
necessary to put his plans in force. Postponing decisive action in the 
summer of 1849 when his foes were too weak to resist him, he preferred 
to wait in order to take the most practical course possible. Yet, he 
was nonetheless dedicated to his cause. Even though grief-stricken 
by his daughter's death and his wife's illness, he returned to Berlin 
to continue his work. 
Whether his first loyalty was to Germany or to Prussia is a com-
plex question. He was a strong supporter of the Prussian King and 
wanted to see him the leader of Germany, but he was also dedicated to 
Germany. His plan of union did not call for the annexation of the 
rest of Germany by the Hohenzollern kingdom but urged a genuine federa-
tion which would allow the other German states to take their rightful 
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place in the new nation. At all times during his struggle he remained 
loyal to his adopted land, but he was also concerned with the rest 
of German~. In reality, it is impossible to separate the devotion 
held by Radowitz to his adopted state from that toward Germany as a 
whole, because he himself never made a serious distinction between 
the two. To him the interests of Prussia were bound up with those of 
Germany, and since Prussia was the leading German power, he believed 
that the interests of Germany were tied to those of the north German 
kingdom. He dismissed Austria from a leading role in Germany because 
she had decided to link her fortunes with those of non-German peoples. 
The majority of those living under rule from Berlin were German; the 
same could not be said about those living under rule from Vie~, 
Although Radowitz seemingly had failed, such was not really the 
case. Practically everything that he had valiantly fought to achieve 
eventually materialized. He correctly believed that Germany needed 
unity to assume a role in the modem world and that Germany's link 
with the Danubian Monarchy hindered this unification. Both these 
ideas culminated in the proclamation of the new German Empire by 
William I in 1$71. Emperor William, the man who as Prince of Prussia 
had supported Radowitz in the struggles of 1850, was to rule over a 
state with a structure very similar to that proposed by the father of 
the Erfurt Parliament. Ironically, this Empire was the creation of 
the very element in Prussia that had considered Radowitz such a 
dangerous person. Since such men as Bismarck ~d.opted much of the 
thinking of Radowitz in order to achieve the unification of Germany, 
his goals and ideas did not fail. Indeed, they lived after him and in 
the end prevailed over the doubts of the sceptics. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. Primary Sources 
Bismarck, Otto van. Gedanken und Erinnerungen. Berlin: J. s. 
Cottasche Buchhandlung, 1915~ 2 vols. 
Donelson, Andrew Jackson. "The American Minister in Berlin on the 
Revolution of March, 1848," American Historical Review, XXIII, 
No. 2, (January, 1918), 355-373. 
Deutsche Zeitung. Heidelberg, 1848-1850. 
The Illustrated London News. London, 1849-1850. 
- -
Gerlach, Leopold van. DenkwU.rdigkeiten. Berlin: Verlag van Wilhelm 
Herts, 1891. 6 vols. 
Radowitz, Joseph Maria van. Gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: Georg 
Reimer Verlag, 18530 5 vols. 
__ • Nachgelassene Briefe ~ Aufzeichnungen ID!!: Geschichte der 
Jahre 1848-1853, ed. by Walter Moring. [Historische Kommission 
bei der Ba;yerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, Deutsche Geschicht-
sguellen ~ 12_ Jahrhunderts] (Osnabrllck:_ Biblioverlag, 1967). 
__ • ~ Geschichte meines Lebens, in Paul Hassel, Joseph Maria Y.2!! 
Radowitz 1797-1848. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 
1905. 
~ Times. London. 1849-1850. 
Wigard, Franz, ed. Stenographischer Bericht '5ber die Verhandlungen 
~ deutschen constituirenden Nationalversamml~ zu Frankfurt !!!!. 
~· Frankfurt: Johann David SauerUfuder, 1 4 -1849. 9 vols. 
II. Secondary Sources 
Blum, Hans. Die deutsche Revolution, 1848-49. Leipzig:. Eugen 
Diederichs, 1897. 
Carr, William. !, Histo~ 2! Germany, 1815-1945. 
Martin's Press, 19 9. 
New York: st. 
l"\I"\ 
Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 
Dannstaedter, Friedrich.. Bismarck and the . Creation of the Second 
Reich. London: Methuen and cc;;-; 1948. - -
100 
Eyck, Frank. ~ Frankfurt Parliament 184§.-49•. New York: Macmillan, 
1969. 
Hassel, Paulo Joseph Maria YQU Radowitz, 1797-1848.. Berlin: Ernst 
Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1905. 
Holborn, Hajo.. A. History .Qf. Modern Germany. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1967-1969. 3 vols. 
Huber, Ernst Rudolf. Deutsche Verfass:ungsgescldchte ~1789 •. 
Stuttgart: w. Kohlhammer Verlag, (4 vols.; 1957-1967). 
Liliencron, Rochus von, ~ & .. , eds. Allgemeine deutsche Biographie. 
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1875-1912. 56 vols. 
May, Arthur Jo The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914. New York: The . 
Norton Library, 1951. 
Meinecke, Friedriche Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution. Berlin: 
Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1913. 
Robertson, Priscilla. ~ Revolutions 2.f. 1848: A Social History. 
Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1967. 
Steefel, Lawrence.. The Schleswig-Holstein Question. Cambridge: 
The Harvard University Press, 1932. 
Sybel, Heinrich von.. ~ Founding of~ German Empire 2z William l• 
Transo by Marshall Livingston Perrin and Gamalied Bradford, Jr. 
New York: Thomas Y .. Crowell & Co .. , 1890. 6 vols. 
Treitschke, Heinrich vono History .Qf. Germany ID.~ Nineteenth 
Century.. Trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul, London: Jarrald & 
Sons, 1919. 6 vols .. 
Valentin, Veito Geschichte der deutschen Revolution YQ!!. 1848-1849. 
Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1968. 2 vols .. 
Wiegler, Paul.. William The First, ~Life and Times. Trans. by 
Constance Vasey, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929. 
VITA 
Warren B. Morris, Jr. 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
The sis: JOSEPH MARIA VON RAOOWITZ AND GEIMAN UNIFICATION 
Major Field: History 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 4, 1948, 
the son of Mr. and Mrs, Warren B, Morris, Sr. 
Education: Graduated from Northwest Classen High School, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in May, 1966; attended Schiller 
College, Kleiningersheim, Germany, in 1967; received the 
Bachelor of Arts degree from Oklahoma City University in 
May, 1970, with a major in History and German. 
Professional Experience: Graduate Teaching Assistant, Oklahoma 
State University, 1970-1971. Instructor of German, 
Universal Translating Service, 1969-1971~ 
Professional Organizations: Alpha Mu Gamma, honorary language 
fraternity, Phi Alpha Theta, honorary history fraternity, 
and the Oklahoma Academy of Science. 
